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NOTES
PUNISHMENT: ITS MEANING IN RELATION TO SEPARATION
OF POWER AND SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
RESTRICTIONS AND ITS USE IN THE LOVETT,
TROP, PEREZ, AND SPEISER CASES
Two recent decisions by the Supreme Court, Perez v. Brownell' and
Trop v. Dulles,2 have reopened the complex and often times highly emo-
tional debate as to the correct boundary between legislative regulation and
punishment. Both cases involved the constitutionality of certain provi-
sions of the Immigration and Nationality Act3 which codified and sup-
plemented the laws concerning conduct whereby one was deemed to lose
his citizenship. The consequences of such a loss is that one becomes not
only an alien in this country but also a stateless individual, dependent for
his privileges and benefits upon the whim and favor of each country in
which he resides. These two cases are important both because they may
indicate the constitutionality of the remaining portions of the Act4 and
because they add to a general analysis of the theories of punishment and
regulation.
A third recent case is also instructive. Speiser v. Randall' illustrates
the most recent chapter in the hard-fought legal debate over the validity
and wisdom of test oaths as a method of "weeding out" communists in
our society. Concerned in this case was a California statute which pro-
vided that to earn a tax exemption, one must tender a non-communist
oath. The principal in this case, a veteran entitled to an exemption, re-
fused to take the oath. Basing its decision on procedural grounds, the
Supreme Court invalidated the oath. This case raises interesting ques-
tions as to punishment because of the particular analysis the Court.used
to determine that criminal instead of civil procedures should be required.
This note will deal with these cases only in an indirect manner.
While the Speiser case will be analyzed as the capstone of the part on
1. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
2. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). --
3. 54 Stat. 1137 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1952).
4. Especially § 9 which makes conviction of'certain subversive activities result in
the loss of citizenship. See Comment, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YAL L.J. 1164
(1954).
5. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). Also similarly decided was First Unitarian Church of
Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, 857U.S. 545"(1958).
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separation of powers, an examination of the other two cases will be de-
ferred to a final section (Part III).' It is felt that one can understand
the implications of these two cases only after a discussion of punishment
in its separation of powers sense and in its relation to other constitutional
doctrines (Part I) and after an examination of substantive punishment
and several theoretical attempts to rationalize it (Part II). Therefore,
this note is composed of three somewhat separate units-the first cen-
tered on restrictions on legislative punishment of a narrow group, the
second, differentiating punishment from regulation, and the third part,
a criticism of the Trop and Perez cases.
"Punishment" as such is important in two contexts. One, in terms
of separation of powers, states that the legislature shall not punish indi-
viduals. Although the legislature can set general standards, the judicial
branch of the government shall apply the general norm to a fact situation
that involves an individual. The constitutional restrictions on bills of
attainder8 specifically prevent the legislature from convicting an indi-
vidual. The question is a "who does" one-what forum imposes punish-
ment. The most famous recent case illustrating the separation of powers
aspect of punishment is United States v. Lovett,' in which Congress by
statute punished three named federal employees by disallowing them
ever to be employed by the Government. The other context in which
punishment is important can be labelled the substantive aspect of punish-
ment. No matter what forum regulates or punishes, there are certain
quantitative limits on this burden. This is a "how much" problem and in-
volves such restrictions as those of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments,"0 the ex post facto clause" and the eighth amendment. 2
A basic and vital difference between the two uses of the word "pun-
ishment" is that in the latter merely deciding that a burden is punishment
is not enough to bring a constitutional prohibition into play. To be in-
valid, it must be punishment of undue weight or be imposed without the
requisite constitutional protections. But in the former context, as soon
as one decides the legislature is punishing, no matter how light or in-
consequential is the burden, the limitation of attainder applies to the law.
As indicated, Lovett is illustrative of separation of powers punishment.
The Trop case involves the use of substantive restrictions. In that case
6. See text accompanying note 15 infra.
7. See text accompanying note 239 infra.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 and § 10, cl. 1.
9. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
10. U.S. CoNsT. amends. V and XIV.
11. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 and § 10, cl. 1.
12. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
NOTES
the loss of citizenship under a law regulating desertion and dishonorable
discharge was deemed punishment. Chief Justice Warren, writing for
four members of the Court, stated that the punishment was cruel and un-
usual. Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring, felt it was unreasonable.18
A further note should be made of terminology. In the separation
of power part, discussion will center on "burden" and "benefits." To
explain: in our society a fundamental concept is freedom of activity.
To "burden" is to impose some limitation on one's conduct. That this
burden is justified by sufficient benefits to society to warrant the restric-
tion is the test for substantive due process. For example, to practice medi-
cine one must expend time, money, and energy to meet standards set by
the state. These burdens are justified by the necessity of having compe-
tent, skilled physicians. Again, certain criminals are disqualified from
driving cars or from holding elective office. These burdens may or may
not be punishment depending on why they were imposed. To illustrate
the contrary situation, a statute might "benefit" a certain group by giv-
ing them a special tax exemption.
The laws examined in the separation of powers part apply to small
groups. Since adjudication concerns the application of general norms
to individual conduct, these narrowly drawn laws might be considered
legislative adjudications (i.e., attainder) to the degree that they burden
people for past conduct or considered a violation of equal protection
when they burden or benefit a narrow group. The problem in the sepa-
ration of powers part focuses mainly on determining when a burden on
a narrow group actually is legislative punishment.
"Sanctions" are considered generally in Part II. The relationship
of a burden to a sanction may be illustrated by reference to Kelsen's
analysis of a rule of law.14 He states all law is of the formula: If X
happens (the harm or the delict), y must happen (the sanction). To il-
lustrate: 1) If A murders Y, A must die; 2) If A practices medicine
without a license, he will be imprisoned; 3) If A adulterates food, he
must be fined or imprisoned; 4) If A strikes B negligently, A must com-
pensate B.
13. This note comments on Trop and Perez only to the degree of questioning the
criteria the Court used to find the "civil" law was punishment. Some of the tests used
in this substantive examination were drawn from the analysis of punishment in a
separation of powers context. The commentator, in the conclusion, questions the wis-
dom of mingling these two concepts and suggests an alternative which might have
avoided this tangling of theory. But this suggested rationale makes sense only with a
rather full examination of punishment both in substantive and separation of power
contexts.
14. KELSEN, GENA. THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 45-46 (1945).
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The burden, as we use it, is the restriction on human freedom to
avoid doing the harm or the delict. For example, the burden in 1) is to
conduct oneself so as not intentionally to take B's life. In 2) it is to ex-
pend time and energy to get a degree and license to practice medicine.
The sanction is a restriction in conduct (itself a burden) which results
from a person's committing the harm. In this note, Part I has to do
with the valid limits of legislative definition of those harms, especially
when it defines the harm so that a fixed group has committed it. Part
II examines the statute as written to see whether the sanction is criminal
or civil.
PART I-PUNISHMENT IN A SEPARATION OF POWERS
CONTEXT: THE LEGISLATURE CANNOT PUNISH
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The concept of separation of powers seems to have developed in the
seventeenth century. Its object was to insure that persons should be
governed by general and prospective rules which the legislature formu-
lated. It was for the courts, not the legislature, to apply the law to spe-
cific individuals. The political necessity for this division of power was
obvious. If the legislature could specially burden a narrow group, the
door was open for all sorts of political retaliation toward minorities in
the form of special legislation.15 To protect against this danger, con-
stitutional restrictions attempt to guarantee the separation of govern-
mental powers. 6
Only early in our history was the separation of power doctrine itself
used as a means of limiting the powers of the legislature to burden an
individual. Cooper v. TeIfair,' decided in 1800, illustrates an unsuccess-
ful attempt of a burdened individual to challenge a narrow statute on
separation of powers grounds. A Georgia statute expressly declared the
plaintiff, among others, guilty of treason, confiscated his lands, ad
banished him. The state constitution contained no restrictions on at-
tainder, but it did provide that all departments of government should be
15. See Wormuth, Legislative Disqualification as a Bill of Attainder, 4 VAND. L.
REv. 603 (1950).
16. Although there are no express restrictions in the federal constitution, separation
of power is implied from the effect of so decentralizing responsibility among the three
departments of Government. 1 HORAcK, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 16
(3rd ed. 1943). In contrast, many states have expressed this concept'in their constitu-
tians. E.b., IND. CoNsT. art. 3, § 1. "No person charged wvith official duties under one
of these departnients shall exercise any of t le fuictions'of another'except as this con-
stitution provides."
- 1 17. 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 14C(1800) (evidentally before the federal courts on diversity
grounds).
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separate and not exercise the power of one another. The Court rejected
an attack on the statute on the basis of the constitutional restriction by
stating that these general principles were declaratory and directory but
were not binding rules. 8
Although the doctrine of separation of powers is a goal (but not a
technique)" in present-day society, there exist several apparent exceptions
to this policy. Certain examples of narrow legislative benfits and burdens
are definitely adjudicative. Legislative divorce,2 a matter of judging and
determining individual rights, has been justified on the basis of custom.2 '
Private bills for tort or contract compensation which provide benefits to
individuals are certainly adjudicative in that the legislature determines
both the existence and extent of a liability. But if the liability is based on
a moral obligation of the state, a law appropriating a certain sum of money
to the individual is not considered adjudication and does not fall within
a state constitutional restriction on special legislation. An explanation
for the acceptance of these special benefits might be founded in the gen-
eral willingness of the state as a whole to be burdened because of the
moral obligation that exists to the individual who might well be unable
to sue the state directly.2" This obligation would provide the necessary
distinction from statutes subsequently considered under the equal pro-
tection clause which give a commercial advantage (a benefit) to a spe-
cific business.2'
Likewise, certain narrow legislative burdens are allowed. First, the
power of legislative contempt25 does not seem to raise separation of
powers problems but is justified as a necessary and legitimate concomi-
18. For cases other than Cooper v. Telfair, supra note 17, see 1 HoRAcx, op. cit.
supra note 16, at 19 n.4.
19. An examination of annotations to art. 3, § 1 of the Indiana constitution and
West's Dicennial Digest citations (Constitutional Law, Key no. 50) on legislative en-
croachment on the judiciary shows no cases dealing with statutes burdening a narrow
group.
20. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
21. "A long acquiescence in repeated acts of legislation in particular matters is
evidence that those matters have been generally considered by the people as properly
within the legislative sphere." Id. at 204.
22. See generally 172 A.L.R. 1389 (1948). In Indiana, although one opinion (1935
Ops. IND. A&rv'y GEN. 53) states that a private appropriation act is a violation of the
prohibition against special legislation, no statute has been so invalidated.
23. See HoRAcx:, CASES ON LEGISLATION 470 (2d ed. 1954).
24. See note 168 infra.
25. Cf. the Indiana constitution, art. 4, § 15. "Contempt-Either House, during its
session, may punish, by imprisonment, any person not a member, who shall be guilty of
disrespect to the House, by disorderly or contemptuous behavior, in its presence, but such
imprisonment shall not, in any one time, exceed twenty-four hours."
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tant to the power of investigation for the purpose of legislating.2" Also
impeachment 7 is a constitutionally-outlined procedure for the legislature
to decide judicially the fitness for office of executive and judicial offi-
cials. This is, in effect, an attainder for public officials, constitutionally
sanctioned as a part of a system of checks and balances.2"
The exceptions to the separation of power doctrine can be rational-
ized in terms of custom, morality or necessity. Separation of power is
a goal in our law, but is not currently used as a specific technique to chal-
lenge legislative adjudication; more narrow and specialized doctrines
provide requisite protection. One such technique-the prohibition of
bills of attainder, is considered in the next section. Other constitutional
provisions to be considered which affirm the constitutional goal of
separation of power are the prohibition on special legislation and the
requirements for substantive due process and equal protection.
BILLS OF ATTAINDER
Attainder is a legislative conviction of a crime. It is punishment of
a 'fixed group levied directly by the legislative29 branch of government
without the benefit of judicial trial.
26. See Schull, Legislative Contempt-An Auxiliary Power of Congress, 8 TEMP.
L.Q. 198 (1933). Because the punishment in legislative contempt is limited at its maxi-
mum to the length of the legislative session, the courts have been given jurisdiction to
impose a more severe punishment. Nevertheless, Congress still retains power to punish
for contempt. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1934). Although originally the
contempt power was a defensive weapon to protect the legislature from threat, assault
and bribery (Schull, supra at 205; see also Jurney v. MacCracken, mspra at 148-49), to-
day it is an offensive power, one to insure Congress' power to investigate. To facilitate
investigation, there has been some sentiment for Congress to retain more contempt cases,
for "the prestige of the legislative branch of the government would be enhanced if it
occasionally handled the punishment in its own right." SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, 80TH CONG., 2D SESS., PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS AND
ITS COMMITTEEs 8 (Comm. Print 1947) ; see Schull, sura. Even though as recent a case
as Jurney v. MacCracken, s1pra, sustains the legislative power to punish for contempt, it
seems of doubtful wisdom to return to that forum to decide contempt questions and im-
pose punishment. The considerations weighing against legislative punishment are these:
Contempt is a punishment. Courts have had long experience in judging these cases and
provide established procedures and adequate safeguards for the defendant. Conversely,
Congress has no such traditions or procedures. These factors seem to outweigh the
accrual of prestige to Congress by trying its own contempt cases.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
28. French v. Senate of California, 146 Cal. 604, 80 Pac. 1031 (1905). In this
case, the state senate expelled a member for bribery without a hearing or trial. The
court held, in denying the member's injunction to compel his readmission, that under
separation of powers, the admission of members is purely a legislative matter.
29. There has been some discussion whether the attainder prohibition can apply to
executive action. See Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Com-
mittee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 143-44 (1950) ; cf. text accompanying note 165 infra,
where the statement of an executive officer may be evidence of an express legislative
intent to punish.
NOTES
Attainders, historically tied with political dispute,"0 were passed in
England in the seventeenth century to dispose of political prisoners"' and
were not uncommon in America during and after the revolution. 2 The
restriction on their use grew because of a recognition of their power as
a means of political vengeance. The major judgment was this: Recog-
nizing the danger of political retaliation prompted by a strong executive
or a popular legislature, our Constitution alloted to the judiciary, less
sensitive to transitory whims and passions and more disciplined with the
traditions of impartiality and objectivity, the power to deal directly with
narrow groups and individuals. The legislature cannot punish; that the
judiciary must do.
But the problem of deciding what restrictions are punishment is a
very difficult one. 3 . A legislature can legitimately restrict choice (i.e.,
impose a burden upon a person) if the act is in the category of regulation
(e.g., a person cannot practice medicine if he is not a graduate of a medi-
cal school). On the other hand such a burden constitutes an attainder if
it punishes (e.g., a person cannot be a doctor if he is a former sympa-
thizer of the Confederacy). This distinction is more than a matter of
words, for, if the burden is deemed to be punishment, an individual is
entitled to full criminal procedural protection; but if it is only regula-
tion, due process is satisfied by more relaxed standards. If the form of
the statute is criminal, then the problem is less difficult. But a harder
problem arises when the act itself is regulatory in form and is challenged
on attainder or ex post facto grounds. Since these constitutional restric-
tions apply only to punishment, one must cut through the overt civil form
of the statute to make the analysis.
The constitutional limitation on attainder has not been a powerful
weapon in our history as a limitation on legislative power. 4 The com-
panion powers of the due process and equal protection clauses have been
much more tenacious in blocking excesses of legislative power. Never-
30. "Bills of this sort have been most usually passed in England in times of re-
bellion or gross subserviency to the Crown, or of violent political excitements; periods
in which all nations are most liable (as well the free as the enslaved) to forget their
duties and to trample upon the rights and liberties of others." SToRY, CoMMENTA1UES
ON THE CoNSTTuTION § 1338 (1st ed. 1833).
31. See Cummins v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 322-23 (1866).
32. See Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation Dri4ng the Amerca. Revolution, 3
ILL. L. REv. 81 (1908) and Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COLUm. L. REv. 1
(1914). For early examples, see Respublica v. Gordon, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 252 (1788);
Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 (1800).
33. See Annot., 90 L. Ed. 1267, 1271 (1945).
34. In a compilation of cases prior to 1945, only thirteen statutes were invalidated
on attainder grounds. Since 1945, only two statutes have been invalidated as attainder.
See summary of pre-Lovett cases, id. at 1292.
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theless, twice in our history, the challenge of attainder was used to stymie
major political retaliation. 5 The more recent case, Lovett v. United
States, has stimulated great interest in the clause as a possible stabilizer
in a period of political hysteria or fear. 8 Therefore, an examination of
the present theory of attainder is timely and beneficial.
Since attainder only prevents legislative punishment and not merely
regulation of a narrow group, the problem of determining when the
legislature is punishing is critical. As an aid in determining the essential
indicators of legislative punishment, an examination of two seventeenth
century English attainders is helpful. The first attainted the Earl of
Clarendon" and decreed he should suffer perpetual exile and be forever
banished from the realm. It stated further that if he should flee and
then return to the country after a certain date, he would be guilty of
treason; but in the alternative if he should surrender himself for trial
before that date, the statutory penalties would be of no effect.8" The
second illustrative attainder was that against the Earl of Kildare" which
said that "all such persons which be or heretofore have been . . . con-
federated . . . in his false and traitorous acts and purposes shall in like-
wise stand, and be attainted, adjudged, and convicted of high treason."
These two examples seem to indicate the essentials of English at-
tainder. First, within the statute, the attainted persons were named or
a class was identified; second, it was clear that the legislature intended to
punish the individuals since it declared them guilty of a crime; and fi-
nally, a burden--either capital or non-capital-was imposed as the pun-
35. Cummins v. Missouri; Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866);
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
36. Lovett did seem to stimulate attainder challenges, but they met with very limited
success. Of thirty-three cases where attainder was an issue, only two were held to be
attainder, and these holdings are questionable. See notes 61 and 116 infra. Although
most of the unsuccessful attainder cases involved anti-subversive legislation, many cases
had to do with general regulatory statutes in the labor and police power fields. In a
number of cases the attainder argument was merely "padding." One can safely con-
clude that Lovett did not provide a renaissance of attainder as a powerful tool limiting
legislative power. Cf. the flurry of post-Cummnings cases in which attainder "was used
in a number of cases which arose thereafter, but with almost uniform lack of success."
Norville, Bill of Attainder-A Rediscovered Weapon Against Discriminatory Legislation,
26 ORE. L. REv. 78, 97 (1946).
37. Reported in 6 HowI.'s STATE TRIAL 391, and quoted in Cummins v. Missouri,
71 U.S. at 324.
38. This latter sentence provides some writers with proof that attainder may be
"future." See note 56 infra for a discussion of this point.
39. 3 Statutes of the Realm, 694, 1535, 28 Hen. 8, c. 18. Also quoted in Cummins
v. Missouri, 71 U.S. at 323.
NOTES
ishment4  These three attributes-class, intent, and burden-are the
touchstone of an analysis of present day attainder.
1. Class: Who Can Be the Object of Attainder? In the English
attainder, the party burdened was named or identified. Today, there is
little doubt that if a person is named in the statute and the requisite legis-
lative intent to punish is shown, it is attainder.4 A greater problem arises
when one challenges a statute which burdens a class. As in the English
attainder of the Earl of Kildare, a group of individuals need not be
named, but can be identified as a class.42
A discussion of class necessitates additional terminology. At the
time it was passed the attainder of the Earl of Kildare burdened a deter-
minable group--"all such persons which be or heretofore have been"
allied with him. By its terms, the statute was retrospective. This type
of statute is labelled a "disability,"4 and the class which is burdened is
"fixed." People fall within the classification because of activity prior
to the passage of the statute. Nothing they do now allows them to re-
move themselves from the group to which the statute applies. If a leg-
islature intends to punish this fixed group, then it is attainder. At the
opposite end of the spectrum is a statutory "qualification" which involves
a "shifting" group. The statute is prospective, not retrospective. Since
future conduct is the test of membership in the statutory class, the group
is "shifting." At the time it is passed, the individuals who will suffer
the burden of the statute cannot be known."4
40. Although in English practice attainders referred to capital punishment, and bills
of pains and penalties were non-capital, it is clear that our constitutional restriction on
attainder includes both categories. Ibid. The definition of attainder used here is inclu-
sive of both types of punishment.
41. In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), Congress enacted a law
which expressly prevented the expenditure of federal funds to compensate Lovett and
two others for federal employment. This permanently withdrw any opportunity to
work for the Government. On a showing of an intent to punish the law fell as an
attainder. See text accompanying note 92 infra.
42. See note 39 infra.
43. Cf. Wormuth, supra note 15.
44. One distinction should be made. Upon its passage, a statute generally will
apply to certain individuals, those who by chance have property interests tied up in the
preservation of the status quo. But this does not make the class fixed, for each of
these individuals may take himself out of the statutory classification. To illustrate, a
statute may withdraw all licenses for naturopaths and require that they must pass a
general medical examination. With the passage of the statute, all incumbent naturo-
paths find endangered certain property rights they may have worked long years to
secure, i.e., their status, clientele and equipment. But the process of withdrawing from
the class (by passing medical boards) is examined in terms of reasonable regulation.
Cf. Davis v. Beeler at note 160 infra. Similarly in Perez v. Board of Commissioners, 78
Cal. App. 2d 638, 178 P.2d 537 (1947), an ordinance provided that policemen henceforth
cannot hold membership in an international union. At the time the ordinance became
effective, certain policemen had property rights in union pension and security programs.
But the class was not fixed, for each policeman had an opportunity to withdraw himself
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Decisions relating to attainder seem to mirror this distinction-at
least those decisions relating to political conduct.45 In the familiar post-
Civil War Test Oath cases- Garland" and Cummins 4 -- statutes, civil in
form, disabled a fixed group (those actively sympathetic and those "soft
on" the Confederacy) by disallowing these persons to follow certain pro-
fessions. The statutes held unconstitutional-involving the priesthood
and the practice of law-were typical of the legislative attempts publicly
to reprimand subversive individuals.
But, by contrast, recent statutes which are qualifications and involve
shifting classes withstand the challenge of attainder. In American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds," the Taft-Hartley Act required leaders of
all unions who wished to take advantage of the Act to swear a test oath
that they were not members of or sympathetic to the Communist Party.
Citing Lovett, Garland and Cummins, the union attacked this statute as
attainder. The Court distinguished the earlier cases on the ground that
they disabled, they punished for past action, while the Taft-Hartley Act
was concerned with preventing future conduct. The statute was written
in terms of a condition or a qualification. "Members of these groups
identified in the charge are free to serve at any time they renounce (their)
allegiances," but in Cummins, Garland and Lovett, "nothing that those
persons could ever do would change that result."49  Therefore, because
the statute is prospective this burden is not attainder, but regulation, and
must meet the requisite standards for substantive due process."0 Like-
wise, in Garner v. Board of Public Works,5 a Los Angeles ordinance re-
quired government employees to swear under oath that they did not and
had not for five years advocated nor belonged to a group which advo-
from the classification of the statute and thereby make himself eligible for employment
as a policeman by disaffiliating from the union. Whether it is legitimate to force this
choice on a policeman is the subject matter of a substantive due process analysis. But
the crucial element that distinguishes these situations from a fixed class is that here one
can withdraw himself from the statutory classification.
45. The analysis in this note is more sensitive to an examination of a retroactive
statute which bases its disability on past political conduct than to one based on past non-
political conduct. This emphasis flows more from the history of attainder itself as a
weapon of punishing political enemies than from the concept that political rights are
"preferred" rights under the Constitution. Cf. the famed "footnote four" of United
States v. Caroline Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1937).
46. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
47. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
48. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
49. Id. at 414.
50. Albertson v. Millard, 106 F.Supp. 635 (E.D. Mich. 1952), vacated, 345 U.S.
242 (1952), correctly cites Douds as precedent that an act requiring registration of com-
munist front organizations and an oath to protect and defend the Constitution was not
an attainder because it was a conditional exclusion.
51. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
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cated the violent overthrow of the government by force. The Court held
this ordinance was not ex post facto since a statute had been passed more
than five years previously enabling the city to require such oaths.52 Since
the statute was interpreted as a qualification, there was no punishment;
the legislature had merely set reasonable standards of qualification
and eligibility. Lovett was distinguished since it was specific and retro-
active; the Los Angeles ordinance was general and prospective.
These cases would seem sufficient to overrule any attempt to attach
a bill of attainder label to a statute applying to a shifting group and
should limit any case which states that an attainder may be written in
terms of future conduct. Nevertheless, one commentator53 states that
attainder "may be prospective, and conditioned on future conduct" and
cites language from Cummins and Gaines v. Buford" to support that
proposition. If the "conditioned on future conduct" means the statute
may be prospective and the class shifting, these two cases are directly
contrary to Douds and Garner. But it seems the meaning is much more
restricted. Attainder in the future is limited to situations where persons
are named in a statute; the conduct for which they are being punished is
actually past conduct. These named persons are given a future choice to
remove themselves from the classification, and that choice is either illu-
sory or one that has no relation to substantive policy. Any expansion of
this statement comes from a misunderstanding or misconstruction of
Cummins" and Gaines 6 and a refusal to recognize Douds and Garner.
52. "The activity covered by the oath had been prescribed by the charter in the
same terms, for the same purpose, and to the same effect over seven years before, and
two years prior to the period covered in the oath. Not the law but the fact was pos-
terior." Id. at 721. Mr. Justice Burton, dissenting, stated that as a practical matter the
statute is ex post facto.
53. Annot., 90 L. Ed. 1267, 1273 (1945).
54. 31 Ky. 481 (1833).
55. Cummins provides no precedent that a qualification can be attainder, although
it states that attainder "may inflict punishment absolutely or may inflict it conditionally."
71 U.S. at 324. But the conduct for which one was being punished was past conduct.
Only the process of identifying the persons within the fixed class took place in the
future. This is no more a future attainder than if a statute disabled a fixed class for
past conduct but provided a judicial trial to identify the individuals within the class.
When Cummins speaks of "absolute" punishment, it means an express statutory declara-
tion that certain individuals were guilty. In a "conditional" imposition of guilt, the
statute assumes guilt "unless the presumption be first removed by their expurgatory
oath-in other words they assume the guilt and adjudge the punishment conditionally."
Id. at 325. But in both situations, the conduct for which one is being punished in the
disabling statute was past conduct, not the future conduct of taking or not taking the
oath. This situation must be distinguished from Douds, in which the relevant conduct
was present or future. Therefore, Cummins provides no basis for the theory of a future
attainder.
56. A passage from Gaines v. Buford, 31 Ky. 481, 510 (1833), is also cited for the
proposition that attainders may be "future." This case involved a statutory attempt of
the Kentucky Legislature in 1824 to hasten the settlement and development of frontier
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Post-Lovett cases seem consistent with the doctrine that attainder is
limited to a fixed class. For example, one case57 involved a statute levy-
ing a prohibitive fine of $10,000 a day for violation of the statutory
strike and lockout procedure prescribed for public utilities employees.
The statute was not attainder since it was not "directed specifically at the
defendant union.""8  Likewise, the provision of the Taft-Hartley Act
which removes supervisory employees from its protection was not at-
tainder because it was "not directed against any named individuals or
easily ascertainable members of a group. It expresses a policy, applicable
to all within the general classification."5
forest lands by providing automatic forfeiture of all land to the state if certain im-
provements were not made on the land before the 1st of August, 1825. In a much-
quoted statement from this case one judge stated, "Bills of attainder have generally
been applied to punish offenses already committed; but they have been and may be
applied to the punishment of those thereafter to be committed . . . [A] bill of at-
tainder is not necessarily ex post. A British act of Parliament might declare if certain
individuals . . . failed to do something by a given day, they should be treated as con-
victed felons or traitors." For several reasons, this language is of questionable validity
as establishing a precedent that attainder may be future. First, the decision states no
holding on attainder. Only one of the two justices found the law was penal as violat-
ing the ex post facto restriction, in spirit, and the attainder clause, in fact; the other
justice found the law was a violation of substantive due process. Id. at 487 and 490.
Also, there were special circumstances in this case which might well have appealed to
the court. Since during the period for proposed improvement the land was adversely
possessed, the court stated that even with diligence it is questionable whether the owner
could have brought an ejectment action and made the necessary improvements within the
requisite period. Id. at 508. Further, the law was held penal because of the nature of
the burden, i.e., forfeiture of land. But the nature of the burden itself gives no final
indication whether a law punishes. Therefore, the rationale of penalization in this law
is questionable. On the contrary, this law today would be examined in terms of sub-
stantive due process. Finally, not only did the court fail to cite any American precedent
for the proposition that attainder may be future, but also it misconstrued the attainder
of the Earl of Clarendon (see text accompanying note 37 supra) which was future only
to the degree that by statute certain persons, expressly adjudged guilty of a treason,
were given the illusory choice of surrendering themselves to the authorities or fleeing
and suffering treason. As in Citmmuns, the conduct for which one was being punished
was past political conduct, not the prospective Hobson's choice that was given the indi-
vidual. Either decision, to flee and lose his land and citizenship or to stay and suffer
summary judgment for treason, was punishment. Further, not only was guilt expressly
declared in the English attainder, but also the process of leaving the attainder class, i.e.,
fleeing the country, had no relation to a legitimate substantive regulation. None of these
conditions were present in the Gaitws statute; therefore, the Clarendon attainder seems
inapplicable as precendent to a Gaines or Donds prospective type statute. Therefore,
Gaines is not a sound holding that attainder may be "future."
57. State v. Traffic Telephone Workers, 2 N.J. 335, 66 A.2d 616 (1949).
58. Id. at 352, 66 A.2d at 625.
59. NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1948). Cf. Dwor-
ken v. Callopy, 91 N.E.2d 564 (Ohio 1950), in which a prospective oath which was a
condition precedent to participation in a state unemployment program was not attain-
der. Caveat this holding since Lawson v. Housing Authority, note 134 infra; In Goodin
v. Clinchfield R. R., 125 F.Supp. 441 (E.D. Tenn. 1954), the Railway Labor Act, giving
the railroad and the union power to make an agreement to force compulsory retirement
of any employee upon his reaching seventy years was not an attainder. An act abolish-
ing a certain position in state government in which the plaintiff had been permanently
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Of the thirty-odd post-Lovett cases challenged as attainder, in only
two were the charges upheld and the statute invalidated. The first in-
volved a statutory burden on a fixed class by a change in criminal pro-
cedure and is discussed at length herein.6" The other case6' which upheld
an attainder challenge is questionable because the statute concerned a
shifting class. In the midst of a squabble among the city council, the
mayor, and the city manager, the council passed an ordinance that any
city official who disobeyed a city ordinance could, on a two-thirds vote
of the city council, be removed from office and fined and imprisoned.
The court held the ordinance "strongly resembles an attainder." Since
the statute was prospective, the better ground for disposition seems the
court's alternative holding that such action would constitute a depriva-
tion of property without due process. The challenge in terms of attain-
der was premature; the only possible time for such an attack would be
after the city council had removed and imprisoned a specific individual.
Although one accepts the fact that the class must be fixed, the prob-
lem of how narrowly defined the class must be to constitute an attainder
is a perplexing one. Much more emphasis should be placed on the fact
that the group is fixed than that it is small. The legislature can interid
to punish a relatively large group, as it did in both the Cummins and the
Garland cases. The important fact is that the group is fixed-that one
became a member of the-burdened group not of choice, but because of
legislative fiat. A statute aimed at a narrow group should sensitize one
to the possibility of attainder, but that fact alone should not control the
analysis. At most one should allow the size of the fixed group to be one
of the indicators of an intent to punish. That the burdened group is
fixed is essential to attainder; that it is small is possibly indicative of
attainder.
The fixed-shifting distinction seems critical in the analysis of mod-
ern attainder. 2 Legislative adjudication invalidated under the theory of
attainder is limited to burdens on a fixed group.63
certified was not attainder, since it abolished only a position and did not permanently
bar the plaintiff from all government employment. Starcweather v. Blair, 245 Minn.
371, 71 N.W.2d 869 (1955).
60. See text accompanying note 116 infra.
61. Jones v. Slick, 56 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1952).
62. There remains the problem of a statute which is both retroactive for some and
prospective for others-a so called "mixed group"-which is deferred to the text accom-
panying note 104 infra.
63. The problem of determining whether an organization can be the object of
attainder is precipitated by the Communist Control Act of 1954 which withdraws from
the Communist Party all its rights, privileges and immunities. Although attainders
generally involved individuals or groups of individuals, in a well-reasoned analysis, one
commentator states that organizations can likewise be subject to attainder. He feels the
statute in question is attainder because the requisite intent to punish can be shown and
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2. Burden: Deprivations That Constitute Attainder. Garland and
Cummins seemed to open wide the types of burdens that could be used as
punishment.6 The corollary, then, is that an examination of the nature
of the burden is not as important an indicator of attainder as are the
other two elements-fixed class and an intent to punish.
The effect of Lovett is consistent, although the Court's discussion
of the burden is less than satisfactory since it is based on the similarity
of the statutory burden to other "penal" burdens. The major contribu-
tion of this case to the definition of an attainder burden was to break
down the time-honored right-privilege distinction. Government employ-
ment, long thought to be a "privilege," was included within the scope of
those civil rights of which a specific individual cannot be deprived legis-
latively.65 As for the "similarity of burden" analysis, the Court, after
examining Cummins and Garland, stated that "permanent proscription
from any opportunity to serve the Government is punishment, and of
a most severe type." 6  It continued that this is a type of a punishment
used in outright penal statutes for "special types of odious and dangerous
crimes" such as treason or acceptance of bribes by government officials.
But certainly this alone is not sufficient to find the burden penal. Merely
stating that a particular burden has been used in other criminal statutes
does not mean it is, by nature, a "penal" burden. The thrust of Cummins
is that a statute, whatever the burden, affecting a fixed class and in-
tended to be a punishment, falls as attainder. A statute disabling Lovett
from government employment is punishment only when accompanied by
an intent to punish him. But a valid regulatory statute can set standards
for public office which permanently exclude some fixed group.6" A gen-
eral statute that perpetually excluded imbeciles, idiots, and psychotics from
any opportunity to serve with the government would not be examined as
that there is no method whereby the organization can take itself out of the purview of
the statute. See Comment, 64 YALE L.J. 712, 724 n.74, 725 n.81 (1955).
64. Cumwiws flatly states "The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, pre-
viously enjoyed, may be punishment." 71 U.S. at 320. The Test Oath cases reject the
idea that an inclusive list of examples of punishment can be compiled. The latter ap-
proach is implicit in the dissent which states that "to punish one is to deprive him of
life, liberty, or property, and to take from him anything less than that is no punishment
at all." Id. at 320.
65. Cf. the earlier right-privilege view. Idaho disenfranchised bigamists by a
statute that had both prospective and retrospective operation. In distinguishing Cummnins
and Garland, the court held the statutes there involved took away a "natural right attach-
ing to every man, both in a state of nature and as a member of society and as sacred and
inviolable as the right to till the soil, and in no sense similar to the right of suffrage,
which we have seen is a privilege conferred or withheld by lawmaking power." Shep-
herd v. Grimmett, 3 Hash. (Idaho) 403, 31 Pac. 793 (1892).
66. 328 U.S. at 316.
67. For several examples, see Wormuth, note 15 supra.
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a punishment merely because it involved permanent proscription from
government service; the analysis would be in terms of substantive due
process.
The only inference from a similarity between the burden in the
statute challenged as attainder and the burden of a recognized criminal
statute is an indication of an intent to punish. It does not, per se, indi-
cate that the statute is penal.
Although erroneous, the concept that the nature of a burden indi-
cates its penal effect has had some exposition in our legal history. A
most outspoken example is Gains v. Buford, a case also responsible for
the ill-conceived statement that attainders can be prospective.6 8 As for
the burden of forfeiture, imposed on land for a failure to make the re-
quired improvements, Judge Nicholas in that case said
[I]t is not the weight of the penalty, nor the character of the
offense, that makes it a bill of attainder.... [I] t is the con-
fiscation, of the property of individuals . . . . When a state
rightfully acquires the property of a citizen by forfeiture, it is,
as the punishment annexed, by law, to some illegal act, or the
negligence of its owner. .... The right to forfeit is an incident
merely to the power to punish guilt. Without the guilt, the for-
feiture cannot be incurred. (Emphasis added) 6"
68. 31 Ky. 481 (1833). See note 56 supra.
69. 31 Ky. at 509. But forfeiture of property has been held to be a civil burden
incident to the abatement of a public nuisance. In Moore v. Commonwealth, 293 Ky.
55, 168 S.V.2d 342 (1943), the forfeiture under a public nuisance statute of a house and
lot whereon liquor was illegally sold was held to be a civil burden. And two other
statutes were held civil in which bawdy houses were defined as a public nuisance and
which provided for not only a permanent injunction against the proscribed activity and
the forfeiture of any personalty used in the house for the immoral activity, but also a
complete closing of the house for any purpose whatsoever for one year. In both situa-
tions, the defendants challenged the statutes as attainder and questioned the equity courts'jurisdiction, stating they should be afforded criminal procedural protections. In People
v. Casa County, 35 Cal. App. 194, 169 Pac. 454 (1917), the court held the burden of for-
feiture was civil because the statute provided for alternative criminal prosecution and
because the statute worked no permanent forfeiture, but merely closed property to abate
the nuisance. The former "alternative" argument is considered in note 201 infra, and
the latter "narrow-gauge" approach is discussed in the text accompanying note 213 infra.
State ex reL Wilcox v. Gilbert, 126 Minn. 95, 147 N.W. 953 (1914), which in addition
included a $300 penalty, emphasized the "regulatory" nature of a nuisance statute and
the alternative argument that criminal sections were also created. Consistent with the
theory of this note these statutes are not attainder since neither persons nor certain
property is within a fixed class. But in addition, these cases indicate that forfeiture,
as a burden, when disguised in a nuisance statute, is not regarded as punishment. For-
feiture of real property employed in violation of valid revenue laws has been held not
attainder, but a civil regulation appropriate to accomplish the purpose of the act. United
States v. Distillery, 25 Fed. Cas. 866 (No. 14965) (D. Del.) 1896. Similarly, a retro-
active post-Civil War statute which exempted from liability those who had caused dam-
age to private property while acting under military command was a non-penal exemp-
tion. That the forfeiture of the property owner's cause of action was not penal was "too
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This case,"0 which allows the nature of the burden to control the
definition of a penal burden, is contrary to the holding of the Cummins
case. The sort of test it prescribes would not provide useful standards
in the definition of attainder. First, assuming Cummins held that dis-
abling an individual from following a profession is a punishment per se,
how would one treat a statute which forbade convicted felons from prac-
ticing medicine ?"' The statute operated retroactively, and therefore ap-
plied partially to a fixed group. It would be folly to argue that by the
nature of the burden, loss of such an opportunity is punishment in all
situations. Likewise, a single burden, e.g., requiring a person to leave
the country, may be punishment to a citizen and regulation to an alien.
7
The essential point is that one must look to other factors than the bur-
den itself; in these illustrations the purpose for the burden and the status
of the person being burdened are relevant.
If the nature of the burden per se provides no answer to the issue of
attainder, then the holdings of two post-Lovett cases seem erroneously
founded. In one,7 an act prohibiting public employees from striking was
challenged as attainder. In lieu of the obvious disposition that the statute
was not aimed at a fixed group, the court held that the act "provides for
certain limitations and regulation but 'inflicts' no punishment. It does
not provide for fines or imprisonment." 7  Similarly, in Starkweather v.
clear to require discussion." In lieu of this bald dismissal, the Court well might have
based this regulation upon the war power. Drehman v. Stifle, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 595
(1870). For contrast see McNealy v. Gregory, 13 Fla. 417 (1870), in which a statute
retroactively declared void all judgments on notes which arose from the sale of slaves.
The court held that if the post-Civil War Convention that passed the statute was legis-
lating, it had impaired contracts; and if it was punishing the payee of the note for the
moral wrong of using the slave as consideration in a contract, it was attainder. The
court rejected the payor's argument that since his slave was freed, there was no impair-
ment when the legislature cancelled his obligation to pay for the slave. This was in
effect a retroactive judicial forfeiture of the payor's equitable remedy of recision.
70. Cf. In re Yung Sing Hee, 36 Fed. 437 (D. Ore. 1888) in which Yung, a citi-
zen, was refused readmittance to the United States on the basis of the Chinese Exclusion
Act. The court held that Yung did not fall within the statutory definition, but even if
she did, the statute was invalid as attainder. The court argued that since banishment is
a recognized method of punishment, a statute which banishes a citizen, for any reason,
is a bill of attainder.
71. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
72. Compare In re Yung Sing Hee, 36 Fed. 437 (D. Ore. 1888), holding banish-
ment is punishment for a citizen, with Quattrone v. Nicolls, 210 F.2d 513, 519 (1st Cir.
1954), which said that "deportation, however severe it may be on the alien, is not a pun-
ishment, . . -. [but] merely a refusal by the Government to harbor persons whom it
does not want." United States v. Hiekkinen, 221 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1955) similarly
holds that deportation is not punishment.
73. Detroit v. Division 26 of Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 332 Mich.
228, 51 N.W.2d 228 (1952).
74. Id. at 247, 51 N.W.2d at 232.
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Blair,"' the plaintiff produced evidence of legislative hostility toward him
in passing a statute which eliminated a position in which the plaintiff was
permanently certified; the court distinguished Lovett and found no at-
tainder since only a single opportunity for government employment was
eliminated for Starkweather, not all opportunities. But the court again
assumed that the quantum of the burden in Lovett was the fact that made
it punishment. More correctly, it seems the burden plus the intent made
it penal. Were one able in Starkweather to show legislative intent to
burden the individual, that the burden itself was less severe and final
than that of Lovett would be immaterial.
Two more collateral matters are worth examination. First, severity
has been offered as a test of the penality of a burden. Burbett v. Mc-
Carty"0 held unconstitutional a prospective statute providing for expatria-
tion for aiding the Confederacy and requiring as a pre-requisite to voting
a test oath swearing allegiance to the Union. The court said that such a
burden is a heavy penalty. "To decitizenize a freeman is a tremendous
blow. It deprives him of his chosen country and home and sunders his
most endearing relations, social and civil. Is not this severely puni-
tory?"7 The court argues that this punishment cannot be inflicted with-
out judicial conviction "any more than a bill of attainder without judi-
cial conviction can constitutionally punish a citizen." Guilt cannot be
judged by election officials or by the "mock-trial" of taking a test oath.
The element of severity, however, cannot indicate a burden is penal."'
Similarly, a discussion of the nature of the right of which the in-
dividual is deprived seems no more productive than an analysis of the
nature of the burden. The most obvious weakness is an inability to cata-
logue the rights, civil and political, of which a person cannot be deprived
without attainting him. In Davis v. Berry,"9 an Iowa statute authorized
vasectomy for idiots, drunkards, drug fiends, epileptics, syphilletics, and
moral and sexual perverts, and made vascetomy mandatory as to crimi-
nals twice convicted of a felony. The statute was applied to a person who
had commited one felony prior to the statute. Correctly, the court re-
jected an ex post facto argument, but it accepted the challenge of cruel
and unusual punishment, loss of procedural due process, and attainder.
As for the latter argument, the court rationalized its finding of punish-
ment in the following language:
75. 245 Minn. 371, 71 N.W.2d 869 (1955).
76. 73 Ky. 758 (1866).
77. Id. at 760.
78. See text accompanying note 192 infra.
79. 216 Fed. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914).
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One of the rights of every man of sound mind is to enter into
the marriage relation. Such is one of his civil rights, and depri-
vation or suspension of any civil right for past conduct is pun-
ishment for such conduct.80
This is attainder because it is a "legislative act which inflicts punishment
without a jury trial.""1 By making the analysis in this manner the court
never comes to grips with the vital issue of why a person is losing his
power to procreate. Is it part of a punitive statute or is it based on the
theory of engenic selection and passage of undesirable hereditary charac-
teristics ?2 This same civil right to enter into marriage is secondary to
eugenic considerations in Buck v. Bell,"3 which held the sterilization of
idiots was not cruel and unusual punishment.
A further illustration of the inadequacy of an examination of the
rights involved is Shepherd v. Grimmett,8 4 which upheld an Idaho statute
retroactively disfranchising Mormans for the practice of bigamy. The
court distinguished Garland and Cummins which took away "a natural
right attaching to every man, both in a state of nature and as a member
of society."88 It held that suffrage is only a privilege conferred or with-
held by the lawmaking power.8" Thus, one is either uncertain when a
right gives way to a regulatory goal, or he is lost in the maze of dis-
tinguishing "natural" from "legal" rights and "privileges" from "rights."
Lovett, which involves a traditional privilege, indicates the latter distinc-
tion is no longer relevant to attainder analysis.8"
In conclusion, the burden itself is not as important as a fixed class
or intent to punish. At best, one only can infer from a heavy penalty
or a traditional punishment a legislative intent to punish. But this should
80. Id. at 419.
81. Ibid.
82. Sterilization was a penal burden for the purpose of the eighth amendment
analysis because historically it had been used as a punishment. Rejecting the argument
that the statute was reasonable regulation, the court said that one could not eugenically
edify the race by basing the marriage relationship on the "teaching of a farmer in se-
lecting his male animals to be mated with certain female animals only." Id. at 417.
83. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
84. 3 Hash. (Idaho) 403, 31 Pac. 793 (1892).
85. Id. at 412, 31 Pac. at 796.
86. Cf. Boyd v. Mills, 53 Kan. 594, 37 Pac. 16 (1894). A statute which retroac-
tively disenfranchised anyone who had ever borne arms against the Government of the
United States was only the withdrawal of a privilege, not an absolute right. In Wooley
v. Watkdns, 2 Idaho 590, 22 Pac. 102 (1889), a prospective statute disenfranchising
polygamists was not punishment, but merely the state's establishment of voting standards.
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875) held that a statute restricting
suffrage to males was not punishment for women since voting is not a privilege of
citizenship.
87. Cf. the discussion of Speiser v. Randall in the text accompanying note 144
infra.
be but one relevant factor. A test for attainder should be devised less
in terms of what the individual loses and more in terms of what the
legislature intended.
3. Intent to Punish. The third attribute of attainder is a legisla-
tive intent to punish. If the legislature actually intends to regulate a
fixed group, there can be no question of attainder, but the test of the
statute should be in terms of due process. Therefore, to prove attainder
the showing of an intent to punish is crucial. In the English attainders
there was no question of the requisite intent, for the statute declared the
person guilty of a crime."8 But American law has gone beyond an ex-
press statutory declaration of guilt by developing two separate methods
of showing intent to punish. 9 The first" is by demonstrating an "ex-
press intent" from punitive language of committee records and from
floor debate.9 The second is the concept of "hidden intent" which
states that although the statute may be entirely civil in form, because of
its effect, it punishes a fixed group.
As for the first branch, an express intent to punish must be found,
as it was in the Lovett case, by looking to records or debate and finding
Congressional intent to "purge."92 Two critics have attacked this growth
in our law of attainder--one on theoretical and the other on practical
grounds. In both Lovett and Garner, Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented
to the expansion of the concept of express intent. In Lovett he stated
that the statute "lacks the characteristics . . . that bear the hallmarks of
a bill of attainder. . . . [A] 11 bills of attainder specify the offense . . .
[and] there was a declaration of guilt. . . . [T]he offense must be a
preexisting crime, [but] here, no offense is specified and no declaration
88. 328 U.S. at 322-23. Cf. the text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
89. That an English analysis of attainder would not go to these sources could be
attributed to the general unwillingness of English courts in construing a law to go be-
yond the four corners of the statute. Cf. WILLIAMS, LEARNING THE LAW 94 (6th ed.
1957).
90. Starkwveather v. Blair, 245 Minn. 371, 379, 71 N.W.2d 869, 875 (1955), states
"apparently the Lovett case is the first in which the court has gone beyond the language
of the act itself in seeking . . . [the legislature's] motive. It has often been held . . .
not the proper subject of judicial inquiry."
91. It is possible that an attainder challenge may be levied against a congressional
committee whose investigations have as one of their express purposes the exposure to
the public of criminals and undesirables by lengthy interrogation before radio and tele-
vision audiences. When the purpose of these investigations is not to provide informa-
tion from which the committee can write legislation, the committee intentionally is
punishing the individual it calls before it. The undesirable publicity is certainly a
recognizable burden. Although the form does not fulfill traditional attainder standards,
such an investigation has the substantive attributes of legislative punishment. This view
was expressed in the defendant's brief in the case of United States v. Lamont, 18 F.R.D.
27 (S.D. N.Y. 1955), which is cited in full in WITTENBERG, THE LAMONT CASE 168-70
(1957).
92. Lovett v. United States, 328 U.S. at 311.
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of guilt is made."9 And of the statute in Garner which required govern-
ment employees to take a test oath swearing non-subversive attitudes and
behavior, he said, "I think the precise Madison would have been sur-
prised to even hear it suggested that the requirement of the affidavit was
an 'attainder' under article 1, § 10. An express declaration of guilt is a
necessity.""4  One can only note, in rebuttal, that Mr. Justice Field was
not at all surprised in Cummins when a "regulatory" statute was sug-
gested to be an attainder. It seems the precise Frankfurter, on grounds
of American judicial history, gives too little weight to the holdings of
the Test Oath cases. 5
The practical criticism of the Lovett concept came from a state judge
who explained that a Lovett analysis would be of little value to a state.
"How on the state level can one find and prove an intent to punish?
Congress could go to committee hearings and debates. In Minnesota
there are no records or committee hearings. Furthermore, one can't
look to extraneous evidence not a part of the journal entry."9" But
while the Lovett theory may not be of much value on the state level, it
may well continue to be important in federal cases. The Communist
Control Act of 1954"7 might prove an instance, for in committee hearings
on that bill, several legislators' statements indicated an intent to punish
the Communist Party and its members.98
The second branch of intent to punish was developed in the Test
Oath cases in terms of "hidden intent" and "relevancy," and is applicable
although there is no declaration of guilt on the face of the statute or in
committee records. If the effect of the statute is to punish, it is in-
ferred the statute was passed with a hidden intent. The test states that
when a disability is based on past conduct, and that conduct bears no re-
lation to a present qualification, there is an attainder.9  To explain: In
Cummins and Garland, former Confederate sympathizers were, in effect,
93. Id. at 323.
94. 341 U.S. at 725.
95. In describing the difference between a statutory declaration of guilt and a
regulatory statute where the intent was "hidden," the Court states that "the deprivation
is effected with equal certainty in the one case as it would be in the other, but not with
equal directness." 71 U.S. at 325. See also, in discussing the ex post facto aspects of
the case, "the provision of the Federal Constitution, intended to secure the liberty of the
citizen, cannot be evaded by the form in which the power of the state is exerted." Id. at
329.
96. Starkweather v. Blair, 245 Minn. 371, 71 N.W.2d 869 (1955).
97. 56 Stat. 786 (1942), 50 U.S.C. § 842 (1954).
98. See Comment, 64 YALE LJ. 712, 725 (1955).
99. It is obvious that this test is much like that of reasonable regulation in sub-
stantive due process. But in 1866, this doctrine was only in genesis. For a discussion
of the relationship of the relevancy test to reasonable regulation, see the text accom-
panying note 170 supra.
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excluded from their professions. The Court held that although the legis-
lature can set standards of qualification, when these standards have no
relation to competency, the burden is punishment and attainder. The
Court found no relation between sympathizing or participating in the
rebellion and performing professional tasks as a priest or a lawyer."' 0
But, conversely, in the case of Hawker v. New York,' which used
the relevancy test as the indicator of hidden intent, a statute which de-
clared it illegal for any person to practice medicine after conviction of a
felony was held not to be ex post facto punishment. In this case Hawker
had committed the felony before the passage of the statute, and since he
was in a fixed group, challenged the statute on the basis of Cummim and
Garland. The Court stated that the legislature can set standards of good
character for doctors. In finding the requisite relevancy in this statute
the Court said it is "not a fanciful or arbitrary rule, one having no rela-
tion to the subject matter, to say that who ever violated the criminal law
had a lack of moral character."'0 2  The relevancy test developed in these
cases remains an important part of the analysis of attainder.'
Summarizing, express intent (be it from the face of the statute or
other records), hidden intent (using the relevancy test), the severity and
the historical use of the burden, and possibly the very fact that the statute
is applicable to a fixed group all indicate a legislative intent to punish.
One problem bridges requirements of both "class" and "intent."
Some statutes may have both "fixed" and "shifting" application. Hawker
involved such a statute. It said no one who committed a felony could
practice medicine. This, of course, was prospective (a qualification),
but it also included those who committed felonies in the past (a dis-
ability). In analyzing the validity of a statute involving a "mixed" class
the group disabled should be examined separately from the shifting,
prospective group, especially when past political conduct is involved. To
analyze the statute as a whole on general due process grounds, with its
slippery standards of reasonableness would result in playing down the
retroactive application of the statute, a fact which should be of major
100. In Cummins, 71 U.S. at 319, the Court said "It is evident from the nature of
the pursuits and professions of the parties . . . that many of the acts, from the taint of
which they must purge themselves, have no possible relation to their fitness for these
pursuits and professions. There can be no connection between the fact that Mr. Cum-
mins entered or left the state of Missouri to avoid enrollment or draft in the military
service of the United States, and his fitness to teach the doctrines or administer the
sacraments of his church." Similarly in Garland, 71 U.S. at 380, the Court held that
Congress cannot indirectly punish individuals under the form of creating qualifications
and that the relevancy test applies to lawyers as well as priests.
101. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
102. Id. at 196.
103. See cases accompanying notes 156-60 infra.
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consideration. This suggestion of considering the fixed class separately
has certain practical application. In Weiman v. Updegraff,"'0 as a condi-
tion to teach in public schools, a mixed group was forced to take a test
oath that they were not now (a qualification) nor had been for five
years previously (a disability) a member of the Communist Party. Al-
though the vital substantive issues were not reached since the Court dis-
posed of the case on the lack of a requirement of scienter in the oath, it is
obvious that, although for the shifting group Douds and Garner might
sustain the oath, Cummins would cast doubts as to the validity of the dis-
ability."0 5 This is true especially since in our legal history, there have
been no valid legislative disabilities for past political conduct.'
104. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
105. Surprisingly enough, Mr. Justice Douglas, certainly a conscientious defender
of individual liberties, does not agree on the issue of the validity of a disability based
on past political conduct. In his explanation of the Garner holding he concedes the
point, stating the statute involved was ex post facto and that the holding validated an
oath relating to past acts. "Garner took past advocacy of a subversive creed as an ab-
solute test of loyalty." DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 132 (1958). But cf. his
dissent, 341 U.S. at 735-36. Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the Court, did not consider
the statute was ex post facto. Therefore, Garner should not be authority to validate a
retroactive test oath.
106. While there have been no valid legislative disqualifications based on past po-
litical conduct, past political activity might be a legitimate basis for an administrative
determination that a public employee is unfit for his position. Garner and Beiland v.
Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958), require a public employee to disclose by affi-
davit or answer his present and past political conduct and may be discharged if he re-
fuses. And the Bar Examiner cases-Konigsberg v. California State Bar, 353 U.S. 252
(1957) and Schware v. New Mexico Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957)-show that
the Court will reevaluate the criteria that the state used to find incompetence. The
difference is that the legislative statement is a broad, direct inference for all persons
within the class that they are unfit if they have participated in the specified past politi-
cal conduct. But in the administrative process, the burdened individual may appear to
argue that not withstanding the past conduct, he is nevertheless competent in his posi-
tion. He may introduce evidence and argue his case. Both the legislative and adminis-
trative disabilities focus on present competence, but the administrative hearing is more
of a judicial procedure, examining the burdened individual with an opportunity for him
to argue his case. Further, since the basis of the administrative disability is incom-
petence or insubordination, a conclusion arrived at by the exercise of administrative
discretion, there is less relation between the past political conduct and the disability than
in the automatic legislative disability where the relationship is in statutory terms. Cf. 22
C.F.R. § 51.135 (Supp. 1958) (passport regulations): "[N]o passport . . . shall be
issued to: (a) Persons who are members of the Communist Party or who have recently
terminated such membership under such circumstances as to warrant the conclusion-not
otherwise rebutted by the evidence-that they continue to act in furtherance of the in-
terests and under the discipline of the Communist Party." (Emphasis added.) As for
the procedural rights incident to the hearing, see Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445
(D.D.C. 1952); Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1955). Special note
should be taken of Mr. Justice Clark's language in Garner, 341 U.S. at 720, that "past
conduct may well relate to present fitness; past loyalty may have a reasonable relation-
ship to present and future trust. Both are commonly inquired into in determining fit-
ness for both high and low position in private industry and are not less relevapt in pub-
lic employment.' This language is not material to the question of a legislative disability
for past political conduct. Nor is the issue before the Court of the legitimacy of an
administrative decision to discharge on the basis of the disclosures in the affidavit. Cf.
NOTES
In conclusion, class, burden and intent are the major foci of an ex-
amination of attainder.' Of the three, burden is the least important
consideration. Attainder is a burden imposed by the legislature intend-
ing to punish a named individual or a fixed group.
ATTAINDER AND THE PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF A FULL HEARING
There is certain confusion of the effect on attainder analysis of a
statute which provides for a "trial." This confusion is heightened be-
cause of the black-letter definition of attainder, i.e., the legislature punish-
ing a narrow group of individuals without a judicial trial. A court can,
and has, become confused because the definition is so stated that the
presence of trial or a hearing may preclude the attainder issue. Indeed
its presence may act as a cure-all for the court in dismissing an attainder
challenge. This approach-rather than the more sound view of focus-
ing on intent, burden, and fixed class-has serious consequences. If a
prospective statute is involved, of course, due process requires a hearing.
But if a fixed class is involved such a hearing must do more than judi-
cially try whether or not the defendant falls within that class. It must
further afford an opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of so leg-
islating to a fixed class. If this right is denied, then the statute, applied
to a fixed group, can be attainder, even though the method of finding
Beiland, supra. The question in Garner was limited to determining if a discharge was
legitimate because the employee failed to file an affidavit relative to his past political
activity. Wormuth, commenting on the relevance of past political conduct, seems not
to have properly limited the meaning of the Court's words. Wormuth, note 15 supra, at
607 n24.
107. Vormuth, note 15, supra, classifies the tests for attainder into four groups: a)
irrelevance- as in Cuimnins, b) statement of guilt on the face of the statute-as Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter requires, c) measuring an individual against a general standard as in
Lovett and d) a standard defined in terms of individuals as in Garland. In explaining c),
Wormuth argues that the Lovett statute was based on specialized knowledge; i.e., evi-
dence of Lovett's guilt. He contrasts the valid Hawker statute which he feels was based
on well-recognized facts of human experience. But to analyze legislation on this tenuous
distinction between specialized and general knowledge seems impossible. The investiga-
tions of legislative committees are express efforts to obtain specialized knowledge.
Lovett can best be explained as a modern expansion of Wormuth's category b). In de-
fending d), Wormuth must distinguish Hawker from Garland, both of which he feels
are based on "general human experience," and both of which he finds involve relevant
disabilities. But he finds that while Hawker did not name individuals, Garland "must
be treated as if it named all of them," and is thereby an attainder. This distinction is
not valid. First, the requirement in Garland was not relevant (see 71 U.S. at 379, 380).
And even if it were, still one cannot state that only the Garland statute identified indi-
viduals. Hawker, in its retroactive application, just as definitely burdened a fixed class,
one able to be identified by a search of judicial records. The only distinction is that
Hawker also included a shifting group. But that fact argues more in terms of intent.
One might infer a greater congressional intent to punish from the very fact that the
group is limited to a fixed class.
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who is in the fixed group is by judicial trial instead of by a self-
confessional "mock trial" called a test oath."8
Therefore, if the Cummins statute had provided for a judicial trial
instead of an oath to determine who were Confederate sympathizers in
the war, the law would be no less an attainder. Certainly the law also
would be ex post facto, but it is still a legislative punishment of a fixed
group. How one discovers who is in a fixed group that the legislature
intends to punish is not crucial to the question of attainder." 9
Several post-Lovett cases challenged as attainder have been disposed
of on grounds of the availability of a trial. Although in two cases the
attainder challenge merely "padded" the plaintiff's argument,"1 ' in three
others there is the possibility that the court failed to examine sufficiently
the scope of the hearing provided the burdened individual. In one,"1 the
Selective Service Act, which affected the status of conscientious objectors
who entered the service unwillingly, was held not to constitute a bill of
attainder. "The act does not impose punishment without a judicial trial
. . . (for) the writ of habeas corpus is available to protect rights of the
individual after his induction into the service. The Constitution does
not guarantee one the right to select his own tribunal or his own method
of procedure." ' The court focused on the availability of a judicial hear-
108. At least one writer, Comment, 63 YAL.E LJ. 844 (1954), misinterprets the re-
quirement of a judicial trial in validating a statute. He argues that a trial before or
after the legislative statement is sufficient to change the character of the statute from
a judicial statement to a legislative one, basing his argument on a comparison of the
Test Oath. cases and the Hawker case. In the former, the disability, with no judicial
trial, was invalid. The valid disability in Hawker, of course, was predicated upon a con-
viction. Therefore, he concludes if one has a judicial proceeding either before or after
the trial, it is sufficient. This is an overgeneralization. The judicial hearing subsequent
must be a full hearing with rights to attack the constitutionality of the statute. Further-
more, the mere presence of a prior conviction will not alone sustain a subsequent dis-
ability that has no connection at all with present fitness. Finally, a judicial conviction
cannot be the exclusive basis of disability, for there are many legitimate ones that have
nothing to do with the presence of a judicial trial, e.g., epileptics prevented from driving,
typhoid carriers disabled from teaching. Cf. Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882). The
reasoned position seems that in most instances the presence of a prior conviction is rele-
vant to present fitness. But one need not admit that the presence of a prior conviction
automatically emasculates the attainder challenge. Some cases, erroneously have taken
this position. For example, in Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 586 (1884), a statute which
retroactively disfranchised those who had been convicted of certain crimes was no bill
of attainder, since "it requires a conviction in the due course of judicial proceedings be-
fore disfranchisement is made to attach." Ibid.
109. Of course, in a prospective penal statute which involves a shifting group, it is
critical whether this determination is made by the legislature or by the judiciary.
110. United States v. Silverman, 132 F.Supp. 820 (D. Conn. 1955) (The Com-
munist Control Act did not curtail the full rights of trial guaranteed under the Smith
Act); Peer v. Skeen, 108 F.Supp. 921 (N.D. W. Va. 1952) (habitual criminal statute
provided for judicial trial on all issues).
111. Dodez v. United States, 154 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1946).
112. Id. at 638.
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ing. But as stated above, this trial must test not only whether or not the
defendant is an objector, but also, the more basic issue: whether by
forcing the choice of military service or jail, the Government actually
is punishing a conscientious objector no matter which alternative he
chooses." 3
Another case. 4 involved an attempt to enjoin enforcement of a reso-
lution forcing city policemen to disassociate themselves from a trade
union. The plaintiff pleaded that the loss of existing rights-his pension
and security funds and seniority rights in the union-was "in effect" a
punishment without trial. Although under sound analysis this attainder
challenge would be dismissed because a qualification is involved (the
policeman has the choice of remaining either as a policeman or as a union
man to protect his vested rights), the court held that since a trial is pro-
vided, there could be no attainder. Here, again, the presence of a trial
confuses the attainder question. If the resolution was in fact a disability,
the trial would have to provide an opportunity to question the validity of
the statute itself.
ATTAINDER AND RETROACTIVE CHANGES IN PROCEDURE
Retroactive procedural changes are difficult to rationalize with the
theory of attainder, for traditional attainder (of both the Lovett and
Cummins varieties) involves substantive burdens. The problem is com-
plicated by the applicability of the ex post facto restriction to substantial
retroactive procedural changes in criminal statutes."'
This interplay is demonstrated in one..6 of the two post-Lovett cases
which invalidated a statute on attainder grounds. There, many persons
were convicted of various crimes in proceedings instituted upon the fil-
ing of an information. Subsequently, as the instant case was waiting ap-
peal, another case held that a conviction based upon an information was
invalid, since Congress had not granted district courts jurisdiction over
cases so filed. To prevent all the prisoners convicted upon an informa-
tion from going free, Congress quickly amended the act to provide that
a person so prosecuted cannot appeal. The effect of the statute was retro-
actively to make an information an adequate procedure. The court held
this was both attainder and ex post facto. The explanation was that the
113. See also Christie v. Lueth, 265 Wis. 326, 61 N.W.2d 338 (1954), at note 120,
infra.
114. Perez v. Board of Police Commissioners, 78 Cal. App.2d 638, 178 P.2d 537
(1947).
115. Although changes in substance in civil statutes may be ex post facto if the
burden is found to be punishment. Cunmmins.
116. Putty v. United States, 220 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
821 (1955).
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amendment was attainder since it "seeks to impose the penalty of im-
prisonment on a well defined group of persons . . . [and by denying a
right to attack the district court's judgment] it would inflict imprison-
ment on them without a judicial trial.""'
The grounds the court used to find attainder seem misguided. As
stated in the prior section, one should not focus on the requirement "with-
out a judicial trial" in attainder analysis but should look for an intent to
punish a fixed class and an accompanying burden. The result of the
court's analysis in this case is to require a check-list of all the necessary
attributes of a trial and then to compare it with the procedural rights
afforded the defendant. To focus on the procedural elements of a judicial
trial is to consider matters more easily handled under ex post facto, if the
deprivation is retrospective, or under procedural due process, if prospec-
tive. If one wants to rationalize this case in terms of attainder and its
traditional elements, it seems this is the better approach: in the pro-
spective criminal statute, the legislature has manifested a general intent
to punish a shifting class. This, of course, is not sufficient for an at-
tainder. But when the legislature retroactively deprives a fixed class of
persons of a procedural right guaranteed by the statute, i.e., the right of
appeal, this indicates a specific legislative intent to punish a fixed group.
This supplies the necessary elements of attainder-class, intent and
burden.
This approach would explain the difference in a retroactive change
in civil procedure, where there is no overriding legislative intent to punish.
For example, consider two cases involving the Housing and Rent Act of
1947 and its amendment in 1949. The original bill allowed the aggrieved
individual to sue for an injunction and damages. The 1949 amendment
gave the Government the same cause of action and allowed its use retro-
actively. When challenged as an ex post facto punishment, the court said
the statute "neither imposed a new obligation nor increased a former
sanction. At most, it merely allocated the right of recovery in such a
manner as to make its actual pursuit far more probable than it formerly
was.""' 8  The other case rejected a due process challenge, emphasizing
that the defendants' substantive liability was the same and that only the
procedure had been changed." 9
In the first case the court seems in error when it indicates there is
no burden. The amendment seems to be a conscious attempt of the leg-
islature to enforce the rent control statute by giving the Government a
117. Id. at 478.
118. United States v. Bize, 86 F. Supp. 939 (D. Neb. 1949).
119. United States v. Fullerton, 87 F. Supp. 359 (D. Mass. 1949).
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new cause of action against a fixed class. To the defendant, this is in-
deed a substantial burden, for practically there is a much greater chance
of his being liable in treble damages. To say this is no burden is to deal
in technicalities, not substance. Nevertheless, the statute cannot be at-
tainder for there is neither express intent to punish in the record nor
hidden intent, since there was a relation between the retroactive burden
and the vindication of the Government policy of rent control. If intent
could be proved in such a case then attainder would be a more broad pro-
tection than ex post facto, since the latter doctrine is restricted to criminal
procedure.
Such an intent to punish may have been present in the case of
Christie v. Lueth. 2 In midst of a heated squabble among city officials,
the city council passed a resolution ordering the Chief of Police to com-
mence criminal charges against the plaintiff police officer. The court
rejected the argument that this was attainder, characterizing the resolu-
tion as a mere attempt "to set the statutory program in action," a pro-
gram which guaranteed a hearing and an appeal to the circuit court on
the issue of his removal. Since the relevant statute required that the
original charges of objectionable conduct be made by the Chief of Police
or an elector, and here the council resolution required the Chief to file
charges and set in operation a complete hearing process which included
judicial review, the only right the policeman lost was his right not to have
the legislature set a legitimate regulatory process in operation. Even
though this is a minimal burden, if one could show an intent to punish,
this resolution would be attainder. But the court out of hand rejected
the attainder challenge. It examined an unduly narrow definition of
attainder drawn from the Cummins case which emphasizes the procedural
inequities of an attainder and compared it with the judicial rights the
policeman was afforded. Not only does this definition not square with
our modern concepts of legislative punishment but also it is not consistent
with the facts of Cummins itself. This resolution affected one person by
name and contained a burden, since the statute provided that the Chief
of Police, not the legislature, initiate actions. This case also illustrates
the problems of focusing upon the requirement of "a judicial trial."
Since here there is a complete trial provided by the procedure, it is easy
not to examine the procedure whereby one is brought to trial, which may
itself be the attainder even though the proceeding is civil.
The Garner 2' case itself may be examined in this way. Although in
that case generally it is assumed that the substantive burden was imposed
120. 265 Wis. 326, 61 N.W.2d 338 (1954).
121. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
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with the passage of the test oath ordinance in 1948, the Court itself in-
terprets the ordinance as a mere change in procedure for determining
which city employees lost their rights by the charter amendment of
1940.122 Therefore, the relevant substantive deprivation was effected by
the 1940 charter amendment. In such a case, the burdened individual
could not challenge the amendment of a civil statute which merely made
more effective the process of enforcing the statute unless there was
some evidence of an intent to punish.
ATTAINDER AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AS PROTECTIONS OF
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS; RELEVANCY AND
REASONABLE REGULATION
Since a present-day theory of attainder is limited in its application
to statutes which disable, but substantive due process applies equally to
qualification and disabilities, it is important to see the interrelation of
the two doctrines. Therefore this discussion ties together the concept of
hidden intent in attainder and reasonable regulation in due process.
1. Political rights and test oaths. Post-war uncertainties and in-
securities brought a wave of legislation to control the "internal Com-
munist threat." Many of these statutes exacted test oaths from indi-
viduals vitally situated in our society; the oaths forced a person to deny
communist affiliation or sympathy and operated as a condition precedent
to a person's holding office, teaching, etc. These oaths were attacked on
many grounds, including attainder, freedom of speech, and substantive
due process. In the development of the theory of attainder, Douds.2 . and
Garner24 all but extinguished any possibility that a qualification could be
attainder. Only if the statute is applicable to a fixed class, as it was in
Weiman,"25 will the concept of attainder be valuable, except if the statute
is an outright disability. Even in Weiinan, the Court is not limited to a
theory of attainder, for the statute under consideration may fall on sub-
stantive due process. Since in the future one may seldom reach the
attainder issue, except possibly in considering statutes involving named
individuals, an examination of the test evolved in Douds is instructive
and a comparison with the "relevancy test" of Cunmins will illustrate
what little difference separates the two doctrines.
122. Query? The charter amendment itself seemed to contain some doubts whether
the provision was self-executing and provided for subsequent municipal action to ef-
fectuate this disability. If this is the case, then not only was the burden imposed in
practice in 1948, but also in fact.
123. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
124. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
125. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
The Douds"8 case involved section 9h of the Taft-Hartley Act which
requires a non-communist oath from union leaders as a condition prece-
dent to the receipt of its benefits. In this case, which developed the mod-
em due process-speech analysis for test oath qualifications, the Court
reasoned that since Congress had the power to regulate to prevent politi-
cal strikes, and since, factually, there was demonstrated a grave danger
to interstate commerce from political strikes and the possibility of com-
munist infiltration into positions of union leadership, a test oath from
union leaders who might order such strikes "bears reasonable relation to
the evil which the statute was designed to reach."' 27 Therefore, the show-
ing of necessity precluded a due process challenge. As for the speech is-
sue, the Court said the purpose of section 9h was not to curb speech, but
to protect the public from the dangers of political strikes. The test is
"to weigh the probable effects of the statute on [free speech] against the
congressional determination of the evil."' 28  The factors considered in
this analysis included the fact that 9h was part of a large scheme of labor
relations, that Congress had decided there was a substantial danger to
commerce, and that the regulation restricted only a small group."' The
Douds test determined the validity of the oath in terms of what dangers
there are to the country without the oath and what interferences with
free speech there are with it.
Two cases following Douds upheld oaths for public servants.
Gerende v. Bd. of Superuisors,"° held, per curiam, that it was legitimate
to require a nonsubversive test oath from candidates for public office.
This decision cited no cases. Garner" required an oath from all public
employees. Citing Gerende, the Court held it was reasonable to set such
qualifications in terms of an oath not to advocate violent overthrow, but
the Court stated only its conclusion. The factors the Court considered
in the process of balancing were not described. Adler v. Bd. of Educa-
tiot"' concerned a statute which made a refusal to take an oath that one
is not a member of a "subversive" organization a prima fade case for
the dismissal of a teacher. The Court did not discuss attainder at all; on
126. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
127. Id. at 391.
128. Id. at 400.
129. Query? The Court seems to consider that the burden applied only to those
who must choose between the Party and Taft-Hartley privileges. But the effect is cer-
tainly much wider, since all union leaders are burdened by being forced to take the oath.
This itself is a limitation on freedom of speech. Therefore the Court unduely narrows
its analysis of the effect of § 9h on free speech.
130. 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
131. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
132. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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the speech issue, it followed Garner, stating there was no denial of speech
but only a reasonable limitation on choice. The opinion rejected the
substantive due process challenge that the case contained an invalid pre-
sumption. 3 ' The procedural guarantees were important factors in up-
holding the statute, i.e., the organizations were guaranteed a hearing be-
fore being placed on the subversive list; proof of an individual's member-
ship was only prima facie evidence of disqualification; and the teacher
who refused to take the oath was afforded a full hearing before his dis-
missal.
All these cases concerned qualification statutes not imposing dis-
abilities and in each case the oath was held valid. But in Lawson v.
Housing Authority,3 ' the Doud analysis was used for the first time to
invalidate a prospective test oath. Pursuant to the Gwinn Amendment,
a Wisconsin statute provided that no housing unit constructed with fed-
eral funds should be occupied by a person who is a member of a sub-
versive organization. The tenant's loyalty was tested by a certificate of
non-membership. The challenge to the statute was in terms of speech.
In holding it was unreasonable to make a person choose between being a
tenant and being a communist, the court pointed to the complete absence
of a showing or finding of any subversive activities in housing as there
were in the unions in Douds.' As in the Adler case, attainder was not
mentioned; the sole basis of the challenge was on grounds of due process.
The latest chapter in the stormy, controversial history of test oaths
was written on June 30, 1958, with the Supreme Court decision of
Speiser v. Randall. 6 This case, and an accompanying one, 3 ' examined
the administration of a California statute which denied any tax exemp-
tions to persons who advocate the unlawful overthrow of the govern-
ment. To effectuate this policy a statute required that an exemption
claimant in his return must sign a statement declaring he does not engage
in the proscribed activity. Speiser, a veteran, and the officials of the
First Unitarian Church, refused to sign the oaths. These cases chal-
133. The Court also rejected the substantive due process challenge that the case
contained an invalid presumption, i.e., that the relationship between the fact found (that
an organization advocates the violent overthrow of our Government) and the fact pre-
sumed (that a person belonging to such an organization is unqualified to teach) is un-
reasonable. It stated one cannot say the fact presumed is contrary to fact or that
generality of experience points to a different conclusion.
134. 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605 (1955).
135. "It is beyond our power to comprehend how the evil which might result from
leasing units . . . to tenants who are members of subversive organizations . . . is com-
parable [to Douds] . . . .The possible harm . . .outweighs the threatened evil." Id.
at 287, 70 N.W.2d at 615.
136. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
137. First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958).
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lenged the validity of the California statute requiring such an affirmation.
The Court, on procedural grounds, held that California's method of
applying the statute denied due process, and thereby avoided any substan-
tive determination of the issues of free speech, equal protection, or pre-
emption. The relevant point to the present analysis is the Court's con-
clusion that the statute penalized speech and that in such circumstances
to allow only civil procedures for the burdened individual was a depriva-
tion of due process."' The Court was therefore forced to explain its
more fundamental and subtle point, why the statute penalized.
Two typical indicators of a legislative punitive intent were not avail-
able in this case, i.e., that the burden is called a penalty or that the burden
is larger than the liability itself. Lacking these, the Court relied on two
factors. First, the conduct to which the oath pertained was criminally
prohibited. The Court stated that even though the state claims it is do-
ing nothing more than computing the taxpayer's liability consistent with
standard procedures, "in fact they have undertaken to determine whether
certain speech falls within a class which constitutionally may be curtailed."
But it is questionable whether this is a sufficient indicator that the bur-
den, the loss of a tax exemption, is penal. Certainly, many statutes con-
tain valid regulatory burdens which proscribe as the relevant conduct
that which is criminally prohibited. For instance, just as the California
statute forbids the granting of an exemption because of conduct which
is criminal, the Hawker burden, the loss of a physician's license, was
levied because of criminal conduct. Of course, cases of the latter variety
can be distinguished because there criminal conduct was not only involved
138. In reaching its decision that there was a denial of procedural due process, the
Court read the California decision to indicate that the oath was merely a preliminary
step to aid the assessor in ascertaining the facts relevant to the claimant's loyalty. Even
in the face of the oath, if the assessor was not satisfied, he could deny the exemption
and require the claimant to prove the incorrectness of this determination in court. This,
then, would place on the taxpayer the burden to prove he is qualified to receive the ex-
emption; this is standard procedure in tax assessment cases. The fact that the burden
of proof here was on the taxpayer indicated that the statute contemplated civil pro-
cedure. The Court then contrasted crinmnal procedure where the burden of proof is on
the state. It cited certain tax statutes which penalize individuals, which to be valid,
must meet the standards of criminal procedure. The Court stated that when the burden
is more than compensatory, the burdened individual gets greater procedural protections.
The Court then reasoned that even though the burden itself is merely compensatory,
due process can still require stricter-than-civil procedure when the tax is "applied to
penalize speech." Therefore, it was forced to explain why this burden "penalizes." (It
is at this point that the Court's explanation results in a needless tangling of theory.)
The analogy to compensation and more-than-compensation is difficult to apply here
since the statute dealt with the converse of the usual situation-an exemption instead of
a liability. But for the individual in both situations the result is the same; he has to
pay more taxes. Therefore, this distinction should make no difference as long as one
does not accept Mr. Justice Clark's idea in dissent that an exemption is merely a mani-
festation of the sovereign's largesse.
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but also proved. Therefore, to avoid the stigma of punishment the Court
seems to require conviction of the person under the accepted criminal
statute.
This theory raises interesting problems. If, in one statute, conduct
is proscribed as criminal and a sanction is attached, another statute, pur-
portedly regulatory, would have to provide criminal standards of pro-
cedure before imposing a "civil" burden for such conduct. The implica-
tion is that once conduct is deemed criminal, every burden based on that
conduct must be determined by criminal procedure. Certainly a great
deal of the law does not bear out this analysis. The law has been willing
to find both civil and criminal interests in one particular bit of conduct." 9
A tort and a crime may both flow from the same conduct; in such circum-
stances there is certainly no requirement that the tort damages be tried
on criminal procedural standards. The tax statutes contain a civil addi-
tion to the income tax of five per cent for the wilful evasion of the tax
and a fifty per cent addition for a fraudulent underpayment. 4 ' Further,
it is a felony, punishable by imprisonment and a fine, wilfully to attempt
to evade any tax imposed by the Code.' 4' There is no suggestion that a
person must first be convicted of the crime or be provided criminal pro-
cedure before the additions to the tax is assessed.'42 Ex parte Wall4 8
provides a similar illustration. There, a lawyer was disbarred by a sum-
mary procedure for participating in a lynch mob. Certainly the conduct
was criminal; but disbarment by this procedure was a justifiable exercise
of the court's regulatory power to maintain high standards for the bar.
Therefore, it is questionable whether this justification for finding the
tax exemption a punishment can be sustained. All burdens that follow
from conduct described as criminal in one statute need not necessarily be
criminal conduct in all other statutes.
The second, more interesting argument that the burden is penal in
Speiser states that because of the nature of the rights lost through the
operation of the statute, one is entitled to criminal procedure. The Court
states that where the transcending value of speech is involved, "due
process certainly requires in the circumstances of this case, that the State
139. "Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the
same act or omission, for the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice."
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
140. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6653a and 6653b.
141. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7201.
142. In fact, the procedure for determining an addition to a tax is civil. Helver-
ing v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
143. 107 U.S. 265 (1882).
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bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appellant engaged in crim-
inal speech."' 44
An analysis of this latter theory reveals that it is of doubtful value.
Mr. Justice Clark, in dissent, calls the Court to task for this theory, stat-
ing it is a "wholly novel doctrine, unsupported by any precedent"' 45 and
contrary to Garner, Adler, Gerende, and Douds. But assuming that the
case is consistent with earlier oath decisions, this particular theory has
little utility;1' for were any loss of important rights to be classified as
punishment, then one is faced with grave problems of analysis when he
comes to conceded civil proceedings which involve even more sweeping
losses of rights, e.g., loss of citizenship, loss of the opportunity to pro-
create, and the total loss of liberty by institutionalization of incompetents.
In each instance, a loss-of-a-significant-right analysis does not suffice,
because in every case the individual is heavily burdened. Nevertheless,
the burdens can be rationalized as regulatory.
To interject the concept of "transcending values" into the determina-
tion of what burdens are penalties seems needlessly to complicate the
problem. The Court could have invalidated the statute on substantive
grounds. In fact, the kernel of this substantive argument was contained
in the Court's rejection of California's contention that Garner, Gerende
and Douds control. For example, Douds was distinguished because a
danger existed which was factually demonstrated in that case; here the
Court found no such danger, but stated that the purpose was merely to
restrain speech.14 This latter, substantive argument is an appealing and
superior grounds for decision, for it would not have further complicated
an already complex analysis by plunging "transcendent values" into the
theory of punishment.
Speiser v. Randall represents the most recent decision on oaths. If
one may prognosticate, an oath required of employers under the Taft-
Hartley Act may be the next challenge that arises. Although at present
section 9h applies only to union leaders, there has been a great deal of
pressure from the unions to broaden the oath requirement to apply equally
to management and labor. The recent Kennedy-Ives bill,'48 which was
defeated in the House after almost unanimous approval in the Senate,
144. 357 U.S. at 526.
145. Id. at 541.
146. See text accompanying note 236 infra.
147. In the Douds, Garner, etc., cases, "the evil at which Congress had attempted
to strike was thought sufficiently grave to justify limited infringements of political
rights." 357 U.S. at 527.
148. S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 606c (1958).
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included such a provision.' It is not unlikely that in the near future,
another attempt will be made to pass an employer's test oath.
If this attempt is successful and the history of the statute is similar
to the Kennedy-Ives bill, it is doubtful if the law would be constitutional,
assuming that the court is consistent in applying the Douds case. The
proponents of the bill base their argument on "fairness" and "equity" i.e.,
if a union can be required to present a non-communist affidavit, so also
can an employer. But this rationale, appealing as it may be, does not
satisfy the requirements of the Douds case that Congress must base its
regulation on facts showing a specific danger."' In the debate on the
Kennedy-Ives bill there was not one word of justification by the author
of the oath 1" in terms of a congressional finding of fact that there were
a significant number of vitally-situated employers who were communists
or that there was a substantial possibility of pro-communist political ac-
149. § 606 c of S. 3974, id., read: "Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act,
-as amended, is hereby amended by adding the following new subsection:
(g) No investigation shall be made by the Board of any question affecting com-
merce concerning the representation of employees, raised by an employer under sub-
section (c) of this section, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made
by an employer under subsection (b) of section 10, unless there is on file with the Board
an affidavit executed contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve month period
by such employer, including the partners, if such employer is a partnership, and the
officers, if such employer is a corporation or association, that he is not a member of
the Communist Party, and that he does not believe in and is not a member of or does
not support any organization that believes in or teaches the overthrow of the United
States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods. The provi-
sions of § 1001 of title 8 of the United States Code shall be applicable in respects to
such affidavits."
150. See text accompanying notes 126-27 suipra. The Douds' Court not only noted
these findings but also referred to a specific instance of such a political strike. 339 U.S.
at 389. It later stated that § 9h "regulates harmful conduct which Congress has deter-
mined is carried on by persons who may be identified by their political affiliations and
beliefs." The test oath "is designed to protect the public not against what Communists
and others identified therein advocate or believe, but against what Congress has con-
cluded they have done and are likely to do again." Id. at 396. Further, "Congress has
concluded that substantial harm in the form of direct, positive action may be expected
from that combination" of being a union leader and a Communist. Id. at 404.
151. The original Kennedy-Ives Bill, as reported to the Senate for debate, had
eliminated the union test oath, a policy consistent with an appeal by the President that
it was no longer necessary. But, by amendment, Senator Mundt reincorporated the
union oath provision and added a similar one for management, stating as he introduced
the bill,
There is no reason in the world to impose upon labor an anti-communist oath
which is not equally applicable under the same circumstances to management.
.. . So, since it is fair, honest, and right that it be made applicable to manage-
ment, as well as to employers .... [I recommended its passage]." 104 CONG.
Rac. 10249 (1958).
Later he made a crucial statement illustrating that although there was no factual basis
showing a communist threat among employers, nevertheless the security of the country
required "that such an oath be equally applicable to management and labor." Id. at 10250.
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tivity by employers. Others who spoke for 2 and against..3 the oath
stressed the aspects of fairness. Even if the requisite factual showing
were made, Douds further holds that one must then weigh the signifi-
cance of this showing of potential evil against the harm to freedom of
speech which results from this restriction. Freedom of speech is im-
paired if there is no showing of a sufficient danger to the community to
counterbalance the effect of such a restriction on political speech. "Jus-
tice" and "equity" do not suffice.
2. Bills of Attainder and Economic Control. Attainder has not
been a powerful weapon limiting direct economic regulation of fixed
classes." Although one justice used attainder as the basis of invalidity
in Gaines v. Buford, this case is of questionable validity.'55 In Hawker,
regulations for the medical profession based not on political but on crimi-
nal conduct withstood an attainder challenge and were justified as rea-
sonable regulation. Post-Lovett cases have not adopted the attainder
analysis for regulatory statutes. Although some statutes have been de-
cided on alternative grounds, e.g., that the statute in question was a quali-
fication or that there was no punishment, some decisions squarely state
that the burden is merely reasonable regulation. Two obvious cases in-
volve the payment of costs for repeatedly filing defective pleading 5 '
and a rebate for illegally taking pauper's aid.'57 A third case"8 holds
that since a statute is a valid police regulation, it cannot be attainder. The
statute which authorized the removal of telephone service and the cancel-
lation of a hotel license without a hearing when allegedly used for illicit
152. Several other pro-oath senators similarly spoke for the bill in terms of justice
and equity. E.g., Senator Case: its present application to unions is "a bit one-sided." Id.
at 10072. Senator Allott agreed with Case. Ibid. Senator Knowland: 9h as it stands is
"unsound and unfair." Id. at 10250. Senator McClellan stated he "never thought it was
fair to have the oath applicable to only one side." Id. at 10252.
153. It is significant that the opponents to the reintroduction and expansion of the
oath into the Taft-Hartley procedure objected on grounds of utility, not constitutionality.
See the testimony of Senators McNamara (Ibid.), Morse (Id. at 10253), and Kennedy
(Id. at 10254).
154. See note 45 supra.
155. See note 106 supra.
156. The payment of treble costs by a party filing three defective pleadings was
not attainder since it applied only to civil procedure and it inflicted no punishment of
fine or imprisonment, but only a money judgment for unreasonably consuming the time
and money of the court and litigants. Moffett v. Commerce Trust, 354 Mo. 1098, 193
S.W.2d 588 (1946).
157. A statute for double the amount of pauper's aid received if the "pauper" ac-
tually had more than a stated amount of wealth was held merely a burden to further
public policy and secure obedience to the law. Department of Social Welfare v. Gardi-
ner, 94 Cal. App. 431, 210 P.2d 855 (1949). The court also erroneously held as con-
trolling the fact that defendant was not formally adjudged a criminal. Contra, Cunmins
and Lovett.
158. Southern Bell Telegraph and Tel. Co. v. Nineteen Hundred One Collins Corp.,
83 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1955).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
gambling was justified as a valid protection of the Florida treasury
which was supported in part by a tax levied on pari-mutual betting. This
statute was a qualification and the attainder challenge could be met on
that ground. But even if a fixed group and specific individuals are in-
volved, the answer of reasonable regulation will meet the attainder at-
tack."' In Davis v. Beeler,6 ' the legislature repealed an act that set
standards for naturopaths and required those who wanted to continue to
practice to pass the more stringent test for osteopaths. The burden was
the loss of professional status and clientele in which much time and
money had been invested before the act was passed. This was held rea-
sonable regulation because a more broad general classification was
made. 6'
In all the cited instances, the attainder argument seemed mere "make-
weight." But one is left with the problem of the availability of an at-
tainder challenge to a law which, for example, would increase by fifty
per cent the tax rate on all auto manufacturers who produced more than
ten per cent of the national market the previous year. Could one say that
the legislature is passing judgment on such firms and that it is punishing
them since there is no relevancy between the past conduct and the present
fitness to carry on business? One case has hinted that attainder might
be applied where the statutes contemplate pure economic control. In
McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 6' a severely sanctioned. 3
monopoly statute in Louisiana applied in effect only to American Sugar.""
The Attorney General of the state, in his answer, admitted that the statute
was passed in view of American Sugar's conduct and made intimations
as to the company's wickedness.' 65 Mr. Justice Holmes, for the Court,
159. Cf. Hawker.
160. 185 Tenn. 638, 207 S.W.2d 343 (1947).
161. Cf. when the attack is on grounds of due process: "[R]etroactive legislation
is often reasonable and valid. For instance, the Supreme Court has upheld a 1935 statute
taxing income received in 1933, a statute providing for deportation of aliens on account
of acts committed before enactment of the statute, a legislative extension of a statutory
period of limitation which had already run,* a statutory withdrawal of a vested right to
a tax refund, a legislative ratification of tax collections admittedly illegal when made,
and the re-negotiation of war contracts entered into before the enactment of the
Re-negotiation Act." DAvis, ADMINISTRATmv LAw. 211-12 (1951). See also Graham v.
Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409 (1931), for a collection and full survey of authority. In each
case above, a fixed group was involved, but there was no punishment.
162. 241 U.S. 79 (1916).
163. Upon conviction, the burden was a fine of $500 for each day of violation,
revocation of its license to do business within the state, and the forced sale of all cor-
porate property.
164. Paying less for sugar in Louisiana than in other states, or purchasing and keep-
ing a refinery idle (evidentally referring specifically to certain past conduct of Ameri-
can Sugar) were prima facie evidence of an intent to monopolize.
165. Query whether the attorney general may provide evidence of legislative intent
to punish?
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stated that "by his answer, [the Attorney General] seems to import it is
a bill of pains and penalties disguised in general words." But he dis-
posed of the case on equal protection grounds, stating the the classifica-
tion, even if it does not limit itself to American Sugar, is "arbitrary be-
yond possible justice."' 66
Although Justice Holmes suggested that attainder might apply to
economic regulation of an individual or a narrow group, his disposition
on equal protection grounds is no novelty. In another situation the
Court made a similar judgment based on the fourteenth amendment. In
Cotting v. Kansas,6 ' the legislature imposed certain maximum prices for
services for any stockyard which did more than a fixed amount of busi-
ness the preceding year. This legislation obviously was economic "pun-
ishment," since by its terms it applied only to the plaintiff Kansas City
Stockyards. Attainder was not even discussed in the opinion and the
Court invalidated the statute on equal protection grounds."' Therefore,
just as political restrictions on fixed groups may never reach the ques-
tion of attainder but will be decided on due process, economic burdens on
a narrow fixed group may well be disposed of on equal protection
grounds." 9
One interesting question remains from McFarland relevant both to
the political and economic aspects of attainder. The statute in question
there was not retroactive; the fact that the class was shifting seems to
preclude an attainder challenge. But it was obvious that the effect of
the statute was restricted to American Sugar, that one test of a viola-
ion was based on the past conduct of that company, and that the Attor-
ney General stated the statute was aimed at that company and its "wicked-
ness." Does the express intent to punish an existing member of a class
override the fact that the class is shifting, especially under circumstances
where it is unexpected or difficult for additional persons to enter the
class? This question seems not to have been answered and may remain
unanswered because of the likelihood that, in such circumstance, equal
protection will be the grounds for analysis.
166. 241 U.S. at 85.
167. Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79 (1901).
168. Cf. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), in which a statute which expressly
granted a benefit to a single corporation while regulating all others in its class was in-
validated on equal protection grounds.
169. Cf. In New York ex tel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 65 (1927), a statute,
under penalty of misdemeanor, required all fraternal organizations to file their consti-
tutions, by-laws and lists of members and officers, but exempted from the requirement
all organizations except the Ku Klux Klan. The effect then of the statute was to
burden only the Klan. The Court found that there was no denial of equal protection
for there was a real and substantial basis for distinction between the Klan and other
fraternal organizations.
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3. Relevancy and Reasonable Regulation. If the correct thesis is
that one will not reach attainder issues in many cases because the disposi-
tion will be on an alternative ground of due process, it is significant to
understand the relation and similarity between the "relevancy test of hid-
den intent" in attainder, the "balancing" speech-due process test of
Douds, and the general "reasonable regulation" test for due process.""
In-Garland and Cummins, the formula determined whether the past
conduct which disabled a person related to present fitness. This is a
rough-hewn due process test. The difference between the relevancy test in
attainder and the reasonableness test of due process lies only in the degree
of refinement of the formula for substantive due process, which because
of its more constant use involves more fine distinctions, e.g., between
vested property interests and mere commercial advantages and between
transferring rights from one person to another or to the public. By
comparison the relevancy test for attainder remains more unsophisticated
because of the paucity of cases that have forced judges seriously to con-
sider the matter of relevancy. 7'
Since the relevancy test is used only in hidden intent situations where
fixed classes are involved and the due process test is also available and
more thoroughly developed in these cases, it might be no great loss to
encourage challenges to these statutes through the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, as in Cotting v. Kansas and the McFarland case. The use
of substantive due process plus the utilization of equal protection would
leave as the effective scope of attainder those statutes where there was an
express intent to punish, either on the face of the statute or in some com-
mittee hearing.
This approach would be a partial vindication of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinion in the Lovett case. 2 In that opinion, he
limits attainder to situations where guilt is declared on the face of the
statute. Although this specific holding is open to question,' the con-
text in which he makes this statement is more sound. He states, "There
are other provisions in the Constitution, specific and comprehensive, ef-
fectively designed to assure the liberties of our citizens."' 74  He is will-
170. It is fascinating to speculate that Cummins probably was decided on attainder
grounds because at that time substantive due process had not been developed, while
Lovett was held as an attainder because the Court did not want to use it.
171. These questions are material to the relevancy test: (1) Is it past or present
conduct of the individual which is the basis of the statute? (2) If it is a disability, is
it based on political or non-political conduct? (3) How narrow is the burdened group?
172. 328 U.S. 318 (1945).
173. See text accompanying notes 93-95 supra.
174. 328 U.S. at 326.
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ing to restrict the operation of attainder because of the available alterna-
tives of substantive and procedural due process, and equal protection.
Although his statement has been attacked by the comrientators"," as
an attempt capriciously to mothball the constitutional protections which
were developed in the Cumminm case, his point is well taken.* One must
remember that in 1866 the Constitution contained few weapons the
Court could use to strike down excessive legislation except the ancient,
express prohibitions of ex post facto, attainder, and the contract clause.
The due process clause had little substantive meaning," 6 and the Court-
was forced to use attainder to attack the oaths. But today, the doctrines
of substantive due process and equal protection are well developed and
provide the individual with a protection from the exercise of arbitrary
legislative authority. Therefore, subrogating attainder challenges to sub-
stantive due process may be the most simple, direct approach to the prob-'
lem.
To rely on substantive due process in these situations may force
some readjustment of present judicial philosophy. In a period of wide-
spread judicial abnegation in the face of a legislative determination of
fact, there might be some reticence to trust this concept to vindicate pri-
vate rights. But theoretically, courts would feel the same pressure to de-
fer to legislative judgment in determining relevancy in an attainder
challenge as they would in an examination of the reasonableness of the
statute under due process. Psychologically, however, there are still ad-
vantages to attainder challenges. Practically, a court may be less re-
stricted by the concept of abnegation when examining an attainder chal-
lenge, merely because it is a new and different theory. Further, the in-
175. It seems the opposition is misdirected. One writer says that if Mr. Justice
Frankfurter is right, then prior to the passage of the 14th amendment a person could be
put to death by a vote. Wormuth, Legislative Disqualification as a Bill of Attainder, 4
VAND. L. Rxv. 603 (1950). But Mr. Justice Frankfurter's argument states that at present
there are sufficient alternatives. Another writer states that a person unable to take
the oath truthfully is punished without all the due process guarantees; he feels this
should dispose of Justice Frankfurter's argument. Note, 63 YA.E L.J. 844 (1953). But
if one must use alternatives, substantive or procedural due process affords the oppor-
tunity to challenge the validity of the statute.
176. Note that the statute in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36(1873), which granted a monopoly to one business, was attacked on privilege and im-
munity grounds; the Court paid little attention to substantive due process or equal pro-
tection. As for substantive due process, the Court said: "Under no construction of that
provision that we have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible, can the restraint
imposed by the state of Lousiiana upon the exercise of their trade by the butchers of
New Orleans be held to be a deprivation of property within the meaning of this provi-
sion." Id. at 81. As for equal protection: "We doubt very much whether any action
of a state not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on
account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision."
Ibid. Also see generally Carpenter, Substantive Due Process at Issue: A Resume, 5
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 47, 61 (1958).
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validation of a statute on attainder grounds might be more durable than
one on general due process grounds since a later court may be more hesi-
tant to upset the holding. Finally, the use of attainder provides the Su-
preme Court with a method of invalidating a congressional statute while
preserving its posture of abnegation. It seems significant that in two
important recent cases the Court has used "offbeat" constitutional doc-
trines, in examining and invalidating a statute, even though the cases
were argued on more conventional grounds. 7 By disposing of Lovett as
an attainder and Trop as cruel and unusual punishment, 7 ' the Court did
not have to reopen the question of substantive review. Therefore, if one
agrees with Justice Frankfurter that attainder is no longer necessary to
the protection of individual rights, there should be some adjustment in
the theory of judicial review, allowing for a more thorough re-examina-
tion of legislative judgments which burden private persons.
4. Motive in Attainder. An interesting quirk in attainder is that
it is an exception to the general rule that the court will not look to the
motives of the legislature but only to its power.' Attainder, with its
emphasis on legislative intent to punish, necessarily includes the question
why the legislature was burdening a person. When the court goes be-
yond the statute itself to find evidence of an intent to punish, it certainly
seems to expand typical judicial inquiry.' 0 Of course one might answer,
it is legitimate for the court to investigate the issue of power; and since
by the Constitution the legislature has no power to attaint, an examina-
ion of motive is essential to determine if the power existed to pass the
law. But as long as attainder remains a vital prohibtion, there will be a
theoretical dispute whether the analysis goes beyond the legitimate bounds
of judicial inquiry.
To give content to the constitutional prohibtion, a court must look
to legislative motive when there is an express intent to punish a fixed
class. But in any event, one partially can avoid this thorny theoretical
inconsistency by examining all cases of hidden intent on grounds of due
177. Brief for appellant, pp. 138-39, Lovett v. United States, 328 U.S. 303 (1945)
(arguing separation of powers and substantive and procedural due process).
178. For a full discussion of Trop, see the text accompanying note 242 infra.
179. Cf. the language from Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), where an Illinois
statute prescribed a comprehensive scheme of regulation for currency exchange, but ex-
pressly exempted the American Express Company. As to the motives for granting this
narrow benefit, Mr. Justice Black said: "Whatever one thinks of the merits of this
legislation, its exemption of a company of known solvency from a solvency test applied
to others of unknown financial responsibility can hardly be called arbitrary." Id. at 471.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter agreed: "Sociologically, one may think what one may of the
state's* recognition of the special financial position obviously enjoyed by the American
Express Company. Whatever one may think is none of this court's business." Id. at 475.
180. Starkweather v. Blair, 245 Minn. 371, 71 N.W.2d 869 (1955).
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process as was suggested in the preceding section. The latter test directly
examines power; one need not worry about the implications of the judi-
ciary examining legislative motives which necessarily accompany the rele-
vancy test.
ATTAINDER AND Ex POST FACTO
A final distinction between attainder and ex post facto is helpful.
Whatever the argument as to the historical meaning of ex post facto,18" '
practice today limits its scope to criminal laws. As long as the law is
penal on its face, the problems of judging its validity are direct, i.e., if it
changes procedure retroactively, the person must suffer a "substantial"
deprivation of individual rights. If a criminal statute eliminates retro-
actively one of the substantive elements needed for the commission of the
crime, all that is necessary to invalidate the statute is to show that the
conduct took place before the change in the statute. But the most dif-
ficult problem of ex post facto arises when the statute is civil in form
and purports merely to set standards and regulate, as was the case in
Cummins and Garland.' In this situation to hold the burden retroactive
punishment, the court must cut through the civil form of the statute. The
problem is much like that of finding hidden intent in attainder, and the
test of punishment of a fixed group is similar. The Court in Cummins
emphasized the fact that the relevant statutory conduct was past con-
duct' and the oath prescribed an "impossible condition"'8 4 on the prac-
tice of medicine by Confederate sympathizers as a means of showing that
a regulatory statute could be ex post facto. But Hawker focused the is-
sue sharply when it said that not all past conduct which is the basis for
standards is ex post facto; the test of punishment is the one used in Cum-
mins for finding attainder, that the past conduct is relevant to present
fitness.'
Attainder and ex post facto are often considered as synonomous or
at least overlapping. Lovett literally was held to be within both restric-
181. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Johnson's views that ex post facto applied both to crimi-
nal and civil laws. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 94 (1823).
182. One author seems not to recognize Cummins and Garland when he states that
"the Constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws has always been limited to criminal
law and has never been applied to civil legislation or regulation." DAvis, Am8INisTRATIVr
LAW 211 (1951).
183. Cummins and Garland made this change in the theory of ex post facto. Tra-
ditionally, the conduct for which one was punished occurred before the statute was
passed. But in the Test Oath cases, there was conduct subsequent to the statute, i.e., the
practice of one's profession in violation of the statute. But the Court deemed that the
conduct for which one was burdened by the loss of professional rights was past Con-
federate sympathizing.
184. 71 U.S. at 329.
185. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
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tions but was discussed only on attainder grounds. Hawker fell on dual
grounds, but only expost facto was discussed. While in civil statutes the
test for punishment is similar for both ex post facto and attainder, there
are differences in the theories of the two constitutional protections.
Separation of powers today is described merely as a goal; and attainder,
parts of procedural due process, and the restrictions on special legisla-
tion are interpreted as manifestations of that goal. The issue is finding
who can burden a narrow group and how it can be done. This is a prob-
lem of forum-finding the correct group to place the burden on an in-
dividual. But the problem in ex post facto is different. Even if the
right group is doing the burdening (the forum problem), there remains
the problem of setting quantative limits on acceptable legislative regula-
tion of a group's action. This problem manifests itself in substantive
due process, ex post facto and contract clause questions. It involves
questions of quantum. Finding another department of government
which will place the burden, as one does in attainder, is no solution in
ex post facto or substantive due process problems, because whichever
department of government attempts to impose a retroactive criminal
penalty, the ex post facto clause prevents it.
PART II. PUNISHMENT IN A SUBSTANTIVE CONTEXT
The preceding part was concerned with the problem of direct legis-
lative punishment of a fixed group of people, thereby preempting the
judiciary of its legitimate function and depriving individuals of their
rights to trial. Here the question is whether the legislature, in an ad-
mittedly prospective statute, has written a criminal or regulatory law. If
the former, the burden is punishment; and if the latter, it is merely regu-
lation. Classifying the law in one category or the other has profound
implication for the persons burdened. For, if the statute is deemed penal,
more stringent procedural safeguards are provided for the accused, safe-
guards which do not exist in the more relaxed civil procedure.
The relevance of this section to the Trop and Perez cases is obvious.
In those cases the statute, the operation of which deprived the defendants
of their citizenship, was prospective and had none of the attributes of at-
tainder. Although the Trop statute was civil in form and had the hall-
marks of regulation, the burden, expatriation, was successfully challenged
as cruel and unusual punishment. The analytical problem is to see how
the Court determined the burden was penal. To aid this analysis, this
Part examines and crticizes various theories that judges and jurisprudes
have offered as guides to explain that problem.
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Before examining these theories, it might be useful to explain in
more detail exactly how this problem arises, i.e., why courts must attempt
to differentiate between the concepts of "punishment" and "regulation."
A defendant may claim a criminal procedural right in the course of a
"civil" hearing. This challenge forces the court to decide whether the
law is actually civil or criminal. Illustrative of the many doctrines under
which a defendant can raise this challenge are these: the restriction on
an ex post facto application of the statute, the right to a full jury trial (to
be present, to face the accusor, to exclude testimony by deposition, etc.),
the question of double jeopardy, the protection of the fifth and eighth
amendments, the statute of limitations, which marks a relatively short
period to collect a fine but an unlimited time for the government to col-
lect a civil debt, the accumulation of interest on an obligation, the right
to a full and fair hearing as guaranteed by procedural due process, and
finally the doctrine from the conflict of laws that one state does not en-
force the penal laws of another.
Thus to the judge in the midst of a trial, the problem arises in a very
simple and straight forward manner-does the accused get criminal pro-
tection? Unfortunately the answer is much more complex. A final ana-
lytical solution is almost impossible to construct. Although some sug-
gestions are offered at the conclusion of this section, the main goal is
merely to point up the theoretical difference between punishment in a
separation of power and a substantive context and the present jumble of
theory within the area of substantive punishment itself.
Two further comments seem in order. First, the concept that the
classifications of "civil" and "criminal" can be an inclusive, accurate,
and mutually exclusive description of all positive law might well have
fitted the economic and legal life of the early eighteenth century. To en-
force certain policy goals, e.g., sanctity of property and the reliability of
a contractual agreement, compensatory tort and contract causes of action
were allowed the individual.'88 In the area of public law where the
state possessed the cause of action and brought the complaint, a law
breaker was punished by death, imprisonment, torture, or a fine accruing
to the public treasury. The goal of private law was compensation and
that of public law, punishment. Within each area there grew a certain
code of procedure, associated with the particular policy goal and compat-
ible with constitutional restrictions and protections.
186. Two exceptions persist today. Both punitive damages in tort law and penal
actions (ie., informer suits) have for their goal not compensation, but punishment and
deterrance from a future socially harmful course of conduct.
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]But with the advent of big government in the last seventy-five years,
the goals of punishment and compensation do not accurately define the
policy ends of law. Literally hundreds of regulatory statutes do not fit
into the classic moulds. Although these statutes are enforced with civil
procedure, there is often a "penalty" that resembles a traditional penal
fine, a money payment, which is too large realistically to be considered
merely compensatory. Our concepts of modern government and the
regulations accompanying it have outgrown the crude, simple classifica-
tion of "criminal" and "civil" law. Second, the problem is further com-
plicated because sanctions and the forum in which they will be enforced
seem to be the least considered section of a statute. Often the sanction
is merely tacked on as by rote and the legislature never comes to grips
with the problem of determining the effect of a certain statute on the dual
classification of "civil" and "criminal" law.
Once one assumes the dual classification of our law, the test where-
by one can classify a particular law becomes crucial. The varied explana-
tions that courts have used when forced to decide whether a civil statute
was criminal or regulatory may best be examined by grouping them into
four general classifications which emphasize their major characteristics:
1) the nature of the sanction (emphasizing the severity or the customary
use of the burden as punishment; 2) the formal characteristics of the
statute itself (focusing on procedure, the language and structure of the
statute, and the person who has the rights to sue) ; 3) the purpose of the
statute (focusing mainly on the compensatory-punitive distinction) ; and
4) the nature of the right (classifying some burdens as more important
losses to individuals).
1. Nature of the sanction. One can find very little help by analyz-
ing the nature of the sanction itself."8 7 First, the types of sanction are
almost limitless, and any classification in those terms would be only
superficial.' s Although death, fine, and imprisonment are traditional
187. "The conventional assumption that 'criminal' and 'civil' sanctions differ in na-
ture as well as in purpose does not square with the facts. Value deprivations of great
severity are common to both. In some situations, the applicable 'civil' sanctions (de-
natruilazation, deportation or indefinite confinement of individuals, decrees of divesture,
divorcement or dissolution addressed to individual or commercial organizations) are far
more depriving than any applicable 'criminal' sanction. Classification of the sanction as
'civil,' moreover automatically deprives the person against whom it is invoked of the
special constitutional and procedural safeguards accorded one against whom a 'criminal'
sanction is invoked." Dession's suggested analysis: "A more functional classification
of sanctions involving deprivations might distinguish between those utilizing depriva-
tion as an instrument and those to which deprivation was incidental." Dession, Sanc-
tions, Law and Public Order, 1 VAN. L. REv. 8, 14 (1947).
188. "In the traditional law alone, penalties have varied so considerably as to defy
summary treatment. They are a tribute to man's ingenuity and sadistic impulses." HALL,
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 318 (1947).
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criminal punishments, and compensatory damages are customarily civil,
the picture is clouded by penal actions, punitive damages, penalties in a
tax suit, the loss of a license to practice a profession, and sterilization." 9
Two possibilities do exist that have been offered as tests. First, a
burden is punishment if it customarily has been a punishment. For ex-
ample in Li Sing v. United States,190 a statute provided for punishment
(imprisonment at hard labor) for failure to make timely application for
travel papers after a deportation order had been issued by an administra-
tive body. The case held that since punishment was involved, procedural
due process required a full hearing before imprisoning the alien, not
merely a perfunctory hearing to decide whether he had been ordered out
of the country and whether the required time had passed to make appli-
cation for travel papers. The hearing must determine, ab initio, whether
or not the alien is deportable at all.
This case holds that once a certain deprivation is tagged as punish-
ment, there must be a full judicial hearing before the burden is inflicted
upon the individual. If the burden is not punishment, then procedures
less strict are sufficient. As in the Li Sing case, Congress can pass a
law, even one that is retroactive, that orders deportation of aliens on
certain grounds, e.g., prior or present adherence to communist dogma.
But the courts hold that deportation, by custom and by its very nature,
is not a criminal sanction but is merely the refusal of a country to accept
the presence of an "alien non grata." Since the purpose of this burden
is merely regulatory, there is no need to guarantee all the constitutional
rights afforded one facing punishment. It is a different situation how-
ever where the deprivation is imprisonment at hard labor for failure to
follow a deportation order. By the nature of the sanction it is punish-
ment, and one must be granted a full hearing.' But custom is not help-
ful in analyzing burdens which are used both in punishment and regula-
tion, e.g., money payments to the government. Further, it is of no help
as the law develops new and additional burdens. The utility of custom
is also lessened when one considers Cummnis which says that in an at-
tainder analysis, any deprivation of rights can be punishment in the right
circumstances.
The second test states that a burden is punishment because of its
189. Cf. the use in civil law countries of "measures of security" which are non-
criminal burdens imposed on individuals justified as social regulation. E.g., the PoLisix
PENAL CODE OF 1932 (Lemken & McDermott transl. 1939).
190. 180 U.S. 486 (1901).
191. See text accompanying note 70 supra. Cf. the Yung Sing Hee case, note 70




severity. Analysis of this test, however, is equally frustrating. As far
as the individual is concerned, there is little distinction between civil and
criminal penalties (with the excepton of capital punishment which would
be comparable only to euthanasia and genocide inflicted within a regula-
tory statute). But imprisonment is matched by commitment in a mental
institution; a fine, by a civil penalty; expatriation, by deportation; and
disqualification from office, by establishment of certain standards for
office.'92 In fact, a most severe burden, sterilization, is sometimes in-
flicted without the protection afforded an individual who is contesting
a reckless driving charge. To clinch the issue, consider that sterilization
has been prescribed for habitual criminals both as a punishment9 3 and as
a regulatory burden.'94 The regulatory statute prescribing sterilization
of, among others, habitual criminals was justified on the grounds that
modern genetic theory shows that certain characteristics are congenital
and hereditary. Thus if this regulatory statute is held valid, as far as
the burden itself, there is no difference in the severity of the sanction of
the habitual criminal and sterilization statutes.
2. Nature of the statute-descriptive. There are several analyses
that examine the statute itself for some clue whether it is regulatory or
criminal. The purpose is to determine legislative intent. There are sev-
eral possible benchmarks of that intent: the procedure the legislature
outlined; the actual language used in the statute; the fact that burdens
are listed in the alternative, one civil, another criminal; and the nature
of the plaintiff in the suit. 99
As for statutory procedures as an indicator of legislative intent,
Glanville Williams states the "legal consequences" of the act are the only
test. He dismisses any considerations of the nature of the sanctioned
conduct, since one act may have both civil and criminal consequences.
192. The general social stigma toward one who formally has been punished might
be a crucial element and the social reaction to a sanction labelled "criminal" might con-
stitute "psychic" punishment for the individual. This informal reaction by the public
(which is not present if the defendant in a law suit has merely a civil judgment entered
against him) can be used to distinguish civil and penal burdens which objectively may
seem the same weight. Of course, this analysis assumes that the legislature has already
stated a certain burden is penal and society has become conditioned to that fact. There-
fore, as a test in the circumstances assumed in this section, this approach is of no help.
193. State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 Pac. 75 (1912) (statutory punishment for
ravishment of female child included life imprisonment and sterilization).
194. Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914) (discretionary sterilization
for idiots, feeble-minded, drunkards, etc.; mandatory sterilization for twice-convicted
felons). The retroactive application of this regulatory deprivation had to be justified
on the same basis as the disability in Hawker, namely, that there was a sufficient rela-
tionship between the past criminal conduct and present fitness. The present fitness was
to practice medicine in Hawker and procreate in Davis v. Berry, supra.
195. These tests are used in the absence of a clear statement of legislative intent.
Of course, when available, the latter source is the more accurate.
276
NOTES
Confidently he gives his guide: "Every lawyer knows, for instance, that
fine and imprisonment follow a crime.' 96  Possibly this rule is sufficient
in England where the courts look only to the four corners of the statute.
But his approach is of no help at all when one is faced with a statute
similar to that in the Cummins case which is challenged as inflicting
punishment.
Several domestic cases have tried to rationalize decisions on the ba-
sis of the procedure outlined in the statute or on the basis of the language
of the statute itself. It seems a safe generalization that a statue expressly
providing for criminal procedures will indicate that it is a penal statute.9 '
But an examination of a statute which provides for civil procedure leads
to varying conclusions. 9 s The courts are equally uncertain when they
use language culled from the statute as a benchmark. Some cases hold
it controlling, 9 while others cut through the civil language to hold that
the statute is essentially criminal.9 ' Just as clouded is the test which
196. WILLIAmS, LEARNING THE LAW 2 (2d ed. 1946).
197. For at least one circumstance when this generalization is not true, see Cum-
mings v. Church, 50 R.I. 71, 145 AtI. 102 (1929). The statute involved the administra-
tion of a bastard-support statute. Retroactively the statute broadened the class which
could sue the father for support. Even though the procedure was in part criminal
(there was a complaint filed and a warrant issued), the court held that the statute was
in substance civil.
198. In a proceeding challenged as putting the defendant in double jeopardy, the
burden of forfeiture (of a warehouse and distillery which were operated in violation of
prohibition laws) was held to be civil because the procedure against the property was
in rem. Waterloo Distillery Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1930). The Court
characterized a criminal proceeding as one in which an individual personally is held
liable. (The use of a fine as a criminal penalty challenges this point.) In contrast, in
a case almost fifty years prior, when the defendant asserted his fourth and fifth amend-
ment rights against a statute which provided only civil procedure in a proceeding for the
forfeiture of property brought into this country in violation of customs regulation, the
statute was held to be criminal in substance. The Court stated directly the purpose was
to punish and there was no validity to the concept that forfeiture was in rem, and that
it was therefore civil. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885). This case seems
to draw the proper distinction between the reason for placing a burden on an individual
(which may be penal or regulatory) and the statutory method of enforcing the burden.
199. Where the issue was whether the court could direct a verdict in a case, the
statute under which the action was brought was held to be civil (although it contained
a fixed penalty for violation of immigrant labor standards) because the legislature had
used "civil' language, i.e., "sue for and recover." Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103
(1909). Likewise, in a case where the issue was whether a civil or criminal burden of
proof rested on the state, the language "sued for and recovered" and "as debts of like
amounts are now recovered" indicated regulation, notwithstanding the fact that there
was also criminal language ("forfeit and pay" and "misdemeanor"). United States v.
Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914). And in Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), the
fact that the payment was to be collected "by distraint" indicated a civil intent.
200. "Doubtless even a clear legislative classification of a statute as 'non penal'
would not alter the fundamental nature of a plainly penal statute." United States v. Con-
stantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935) ; United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931).
Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922) challenged the method of enforcement of a fixed
penalty by tax notice. The Court held that a tax notice procedure was not sufficient
procedural protection since this burden was "not a tax, but a penalty by its very nature."
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states that if the statute contains two types of burdens, one is civil.20
Early cases stated two other unsatisfactory tests. If the suit resulted in
a money payment from the burdened individual 2. or if it consisted of a
money payment for a sum certain," 3 the action of debt (a civil suit) was
proper no matter how the obligation arose. All these tests provide only
superficial tools with which the court can analyze the nature of the statute.
A pair of similar tests have been suggested by writers but have not
been mentioned by the courts. The first is the distinction as to who in-
stitutes the suit-an individual or the state. Kelsen offers this theory in
his explanation of the division of rights between criminal and private
(or civil) law.20' Some rights are given to individuals to enforce (the
subject matter of tort and contract law) even though the whole com-
munity has an interest in having the legal order stabilized (especially in
a system of private capitalism which relies on a system of voluntary con-
tractual agreements for the distribution of goods). On the other hand,
a criminal action is instituted by the state, not by the person injured.
Unfortunately this analysis is overly superficial. First, many civil pro-
ceedings are instituted by the government, e.g., the loss of a license or
restitution of money fraudulently withheld in a tax suit. Further, by
Kelsen's static analysis, one can only consider the assignment of various
rights to sue as a fait accompli. He thereby avoids the most important
Since to show the statute's applicability one must show conduct which is "evidence of a
crime," the statute "clearly involves the idea of punishment for the violation of the law."
Id. at 562. (Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) in notes 138-43 supra). In
United States v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943), the Court again "cut through" criminal
language. In an action by an informer to collect treble damages from one charged with
defrauding the Government, the statute withstood an attack that it was criminal and the
defendant was under double jeopardy, notwithstanding the fact that the statute spoke in
criminal language, "forfeit and pay." From these cases one can conclude there is little
theoretical consistency in the courts' discussion of procedure and language as indicative
of a criminal or regulatory statute.
201. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), where forfeiture of property
illegally brought into this country was deemed criminal, the Court expressly pointed to
the fact that the fine, the imprisonment and the forfeiture textually were in one sec-
tion. Also a 50% addition to an income tax was civil because the increased liability
appeared in a section labelled "additions to tax" separate from the criminal section called
"penalties." Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). But Lipke v. Lederer, note 200
supra, shows that even in this simple, mechanical test there is no consistency. There the
burden was contained in a section labelled "tax." Although the statute had a separate
section for penal sanctions, the burden was penal.
202. United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896) is squarely in error when it
states, in answer to the challenge that the defendant has the right to be confronted with
his accusor under the sixth amendment, that if the burden for concealing merchandise
illegally imported was only money, it was a civil action.
203. Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531 (1871) involved a suit
for a fixed penalty for concealing merchandise illegally imported. Although followed
in United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914), this analysis seems no longer to be
determinitive.
204. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY oF LAW AND STATE 50 (1945).
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question-by what rules does the legislature pass out these rights and by
what standards does one gauge when it has incorrectly assigned rights?
A similar suggestion is to determine who is enriched in a suit.2"5 It
is said a civil sanction directly enriches some individual, while a criminal
sanction never enriches anyone. But some civil sanctions neither involve
a money gain nor enrich another individual, e.g., the loss of a license or
unfavorable publicity about a manufacturer released by an administrative
agency. Further, a penal action (an informer suit) certainly manifests
one of the ends of punishment, deterrence, but it is conducted by civil
procedure; it enriches an individual."' None of these tests provide suf-
ficient certainty to allow their unlimited use to differentiate between
civil and criminal statutes.
3. Purpose of the statute: analytical. There is a set of tests used
by courts which looks not to the sanction or the text of the statute but to
the purpose of the statute. The classic test is the compensation-punish-
ment analysis." 7 Criminal law punishes, while civil law compensates.
The thesis is that the latter involves a money loss to the individual
harmed; therefore, the defendant must make the plaintiff whole. This
remedy provides redress for the injured plaintiff. The concept of tort
and contract law exemplifies this approach. Criminal law, on the other
hand, is punitive or preventative. It forces the defendant to undergo an
evil, not for the sake of redress, but for the sake of example.
Although this generalization is appealing,"'8 one finds many civil
actions that punish. First, of the actions instituted by private individuals,
penal actions punish,0 9 but the burdened individual gets no criminal pro-
tection. Further, many civil governmental suits do much more than
merely compensate. Of course, the government, as a property owner or
a party to a contract, can sue for compensatory damages in tort or con-
tract as a private individual. But the courts seem to go to any length to
tag a statutory money payment as compensatory and as merely a civil
enforcement of an essentially private right. Thus, in a civil action for a
205. TURNER, KEx'NY'S OuTLINEs OF CRImiNAL LAW 538 (16th ed. 1952).
206. Kenny suggests that the power of pardon was the crucial element. Private
(civil) law was defined as that area where a private person had the discretion (i.e., the
power) not to enforce his rights. Contra, Turner's comments id. at 547. Kenny's essay,
on The Nature of a Crime, reproduced in the appendix, id. at 530, is a comprehensive
analysis of the problem of punishment and regulation.
207. 1 AUSTIN, LECTURES ox JURISPRUDENcE § 721 (1874).
208. But even this statement is too broad for two jurisprudes. Kenny and Sal-
mond state that quasi-contract cases are the only true civil actions. The former explains
that a tort recovery is a documentum, a warning, to persons in general not to cause such
injuries. TutNa, op. cit. mpra note 205, at 537. Salmond agrees, stating that from
the defendant's point of view, a tort recovery is a penalty for him. SALmoND, Juss-
PRuDENCE 232 (7th ed. 1924).
209. Hess v. United States, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
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fraudulent return of an income tax statement, the Government recovered
not only'the full amount of the tax that should have been paid, but also
an additional fifty per cent premium on that amount. 1 This additional
burden was a "safeguard for the protection of revenue and a reimburse-
ment of the Government."21' The Court has stated the test of criminality
in terms of an unreasonable excess of recovered damages compared with
the immediate damages the Government suffered.2 '
In critically examining this test, it is obvious that a distinct line be-
tween compensation and punishment is blurred when the courts adopt an
"excessiveness" test which states that compensation ends when the re-
covered damages are too excessive in comparison to actual damages. But
the cases leave one in doubt as to the effectiveness of this test when a
fifty per cent additional payment is rationalized as mere restitution. It
seems to stretch credulity to state that the purpose is to compensate the
injured party. A more obvious purpose is to shape social conduct to
prevent individuals from defrauding the government. Obviously, this
sounds of deterrence-a generally accepted end of criminal law.
Another test of the purpose of the statute can be examined in terms
of "broad-gauge" or "narrow-gauge" analysis. Some burdens can be
rationalized as regulation if they avoid a specific harm. An injunction
or proved civil damages illustrate the "narrow-gauge" regulatory ap-
proach. The sanction is tailor-made to fit the particular fact situation
before the court. When the legislature sets standards for a profession
and violation of those standards results in the loss of an opportunity to
pursue that particular activity, the law is regulatory. The burden avoids
the specific harm. Thus in the Perez case,2"3 where expatriation was a
consequence of voting in a foreign election, the burden was held to be
regulatory b'cause any possible embarrassment to our foreign policy re-
210. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
211. Id. at 401. In Hess v. United States, 317 U.S. 537 (1943), a statute provided
for double damages plus a certain scaled penalty, depending upon the amount of the
fraud- The defendant was earlier convicted on a criminal charge and in a prosecution
for damages, claimed he was in double jeopardy. The Court held that this statute was
merely remedial and the recovery was merely compensatory.
212. Ibid. The Court stated, kindly enough, in Hess that there might have been
some punishment under the statute, but not enough to make it criminal. In Rex Trailer
v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956), another double jeopardy problem, the defendant
defrauded the Government on a contract. The statute provided for a criminal penalty
plus a choice of civil remedies: (1) $2000 plus double damages, (2) twice the considera-
tion in the contract as double damages or (3) restoration of the property to the Govern-
ment plus restoration of the defendant's consideration by the Government. In a suit by
the Government utilizing the first alternative, the Court held that any money payment
under this statute was merely liquidated damages accruing to the Government, a party
which had a right to sue for damages for fraud. And as in Hess, supra, the amount
was not so excessive as to transform the burden into a criminal penalty.
213. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
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suiting from a person manifesting dual allegiance could be avoided-merely
by taking away his United States' citizenship. In the medical profession,
a doctor who is not competent loses his license. He can still do other
things for a living, but the potential harm of improperly and incompe-
tently treating patients is avoided by a withdrawal of his license to prac-
tice. Similarly, by sending a mentally incompetent person to an institu-
tion, society is avoiding a specific harm, i.e., segregating an individual
who is unable to care for himself in modern society. And sterilization
of mentally defective persons, if engenic theory is in vogue, is justified
as a technique of avoiding the potential harm of genetically transferring
all one's unsocial characteristics to his heirs. In all these situations, as
the theory goes, the sanction fits the harm to be avoided.
But in "broad-gauge" sanctions, those of the criminal law, the con-
cept of punishment is opposite. Much more is involved than merely
avoiding repetition of the particular type of harm. If a person burns
down a house, imprisonment is a much greater deprivation than merely
not allowing the arsonist to carry matches. Punishment does not fit the
crime. It is an inflexible burden which is imposed on one for acting in
a legally forbidden manner.
However the use of this classification as an aid in divining the
nature of the statute is of limited use. There is no doubt that some regu-
latory burdens have broader effects than merely avoiding a certain harm
and actually have penal consequences, e.g., the threat of the loss of a li-
cense will force individuals to conform to the standards necessary to re-
tain the license; in turn, punishment in its effect often avoids a certain
harm, e.g., the physical confinement of an arsonist avoids his setting fire
to buildings, but only as long as he is confined. When these secondary
effects of the statutes become too marked, this test becomes useless.
Further, personalization of punishment tends to obliterate the broad- and
narrow-gauge distinction. Such modern, enlightened practices as in-
determinate sentences, extensive parole procedures, and judicial discre-
tion as to the type of institutions where an offender may be confined
make punishment more like regulation. More and more the goal is to
make the punishment fit the crime-to shape the burden to fit the of-
fender. To the degree this is accomplished, the utility of this test is
lessened.
A knotty problem is posed in statutes drafted as tax measures chal-
lenged as being punitive. Certainly it is legitimate to require individuals
to pay taxes to defer the costs of government, but when a special tax
imposed on specified conduct has as its purpose the enforcement of a
certain legislative policy (as prohibition), the tax is like a penalty or a
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fine. Nevertheless, the general rule seems to be that the judiciary will
accept as conclusive the congressional determination that the burden is a
revenue-raising device. 1 ' In The Oleonitrgarine Case,2" the Court refused
to examine the motive of Congress in applying an exorbitant tax, the
effect of which might well drive oleo producers out of business. It was
not penal since the levy did not follow conviction of a crime. 6 This ap-
proach is similar to the test that focuses on the form of the statute. If
the form is civil, that ends the inquiry. Similarly, if Congress says the
money burden is a tax, the court will not question that statement.
Until the Speiser decision the cases that did not adhere to this ap-
proach must be considered the exceptions. In Lipke v. Lederer,"' the
"tax" for non-compliance with prohibition statutes "clearly involved the
idea of punishment for violation of the law," and a summary procedure
for the collection of the tax was a violation of due process. Likewise, in
United States v. Constantine,"8 a $1000 excise tax for violation of a state
liquor law was deemed actually a penalty. The issue was whether the
statute was one to aid in the enforcement of the eighteenth amendment
(repealed by that time by the twenty-first amendment) or whether the tax
was to raise revenue. In holding the purpose of the tax was "to impose
a penalty as a deterrant and a punishment for unlawful conduct," ' the
Court pointed to two factors. First, in comparison with other excise
taxes, this tax was fifty times as high. "[T]he exaction is highly ex-
orbitant. This fact points in the direction of a penalty rather than a
tax."22  The text of excessiveness is similar to that described in the
punishment-compensation section. Second, the commission of a crime
is a condition to the imposition of the tax. This approach is much like
that of the Speiser case where unlawful communist speech was a condi-
tion to the loss of a veteran's exemption.
But even where no federal criminal violation was involved, the Child
Labor Tax Case22 held as a penalty a tax which provided for a heavy
214. See United States v. Kahlinger, 345 U.S. 22 (1952) (a tax on gamblers);
Sanchez v. United States, 340 U.S. 42 (1950) ; Negro v. United States, 278 U.S. 332
(1928); and Doremus v. United States, 249 U.S. 86 (1918) (all concerning a tax on
dealers in narcotics); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937) (a tax on
transportation of sawed-off shotguns).
215. McCray v. United States (The Oleomargerine Case), 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
216. This rationale that the absence of conviction precludes punishment is con-
sidered in note 108, supra. Cf. in result, Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533
(1869) (post-Civil War statute which imposed tax of 10% on any state bank notes cir-
culated, sustained as a tax).
217. 259 U.S. at 562.
218. 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
219. Id. at 295.
.'22G. Ibid.
221. 259 US. 20 (1922).
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exaction (a ten per cent tax on profits) for deviation from a detailed and
specific course of conduct, employing a child less than fourteen years of
age.222 But as was shown by Speiser, there is no longer any magic in the
fact that the statute is written as a tax, especially when the tax or ex-
emption is based on criminal conduct and the conduct involves a "trans-
cendent" value such as speech. In such circumstances, the statute is
deemed to penalize, and certain criminal procedures are guaranteed the
burdened individual. This recent decision may portend a more piercing
review of legislative tax statutes, even when less "transcendent" values
are involved.
The test to distinguish civil from criminal statutes sometimes is
whether a burden carries out the purpose of the statute. But the effect of
a burden which "aids in carrying out the purpose of the statute" is am-
biguous. Sometimes this makes the burden criminal; sometimes, civil.
Not only is this test inconclusive, but also it is strange that this criterion
would be used at all; for the purpose of all burdens, civil and penal, is to
achieve the policy ends of the statute. It might be significant that in the
cases in which this test was used, the issues were all nonconstitutional.
In some circumstances, carrying out the purpose of the statute may
make the burden a penalty. Rodgers v. United States22 illustrates this
situation. Under a statute assessing penalties for non-compliance with
acreage limitations, the question arose whether interest should accrue on
this penalty. By statute interest did accrue if the payment was for civil
damages, but not if it were a fine. The court held the purpose of the
payment was not to raise revenue as a general tax, but to force farmers
to comply with agricultural policy, i.e., to shape farmers' conduct. This
made it a penalty, and interest did not accrue.22 4
In Pan-American Petroleum and Transport Co. v. United States,225
the Government sought to cancel oil leases obtained through fraud. The
defendants contended that, consistent with general equity procedure, the
United States was required to make restitution of the defendant's down
payments before the leases could be cancelled. But the Court held it was
not necessary to return the purchase money, since the agreements tended
to defeat a national policy of preserving coal and oil reserves. Therefore,
the defendant lost not only the contract but also his down payments.
222. Id. at 36.
223. 332 U.S. 371 (1947).
224. Note that here the farmer did not take the next logical step and ask for
criminal procedural protections in determining whether he had failed to comply with the
standards of conduct set for farmers. Had he done so, then the constitutional issue
would have been squarely presented.
225. 273 U.S. 456 (1927). Cf. United States v. Trinidad Coal Co., 137 U.S. 160
(1890).
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"Implicit in both cases is the rationale that the proceedings were not just
to recover title but to vindicate, by punitive action, a broad national
policy." '226 The Court admitted the proceedings were to punish, but al-
lowed this purpose to be carried out in an equity proceeding."27
In contrast is Ehrlich v. United States228 where the Government had
to make restitution of the defendant's payments before cancelling the
contract since no purpose was served by the Government's retaining the
defendant's consideration. If by retaining the consideration, the purpose
of the statute was not further carried out, the result would be punish-
ment. The court said that the Government, in selling land to veterans,
was no more than an ordinary real estate agent and that restoration of
the status quo would not thwart or frustrate obedience to the statute, but
that criminal penalties for fraud were a sufficient deterrant. Therefore,
while in Rodgers the penalty was criminal since it was to carry out the
purpose of the statute and not merely to raise revenue, in Ehrlich a loss of
the down payment to the vendee was punishment, since the loss did not
carry out the purpose of the statute. But in Pan-American,2" when the
same burden did carry out the purpose of the statute and was classified
as a punishment, such a burden could be imposed in an equity court.
An examination of contempt further illustrates the inconsistent use
of the concept of "carrying out the purpose of the statute." The power
of the court to punish for contempt traditionally has had for its purpose
effectuating judicial orders or affording Congress the opportunity to
investigate and question individuals in the process of legislating. There-
fore, contempt as a civil burden was used to force compliance with the
purpose of the order. For example, detention is conditioned on a per-
son's refusal to follow a court order. If he complies, the threat dis-
appears. But in the recent case of Green v. United States,8 ' contempt
procedure (civil, since there was no jury trial) was used to punish. Green
and Winston jumped bail but gave themselves up voluntarily. Under
contempt charges, they were sentenced to three years in jail, a sentence
which can only be punishment, deterring others from jumping bail in
the future. This strays far from the concept of contempt as a civil de-
vice to force prospective compliance to a specific legislative or judicial
decree.
226. Ehrlich v. United States, 252 F.2d 772, 777 (5th Cir. 1958).
227. This might give an answer to the question of what would happen in Rodgers
v. United States, 332 U.S. 371 (1947), had the defendant asked for criminal procedure.
228. 252 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1958).
229. See note 225, supra.
230. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
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Further, a civil burden which reasonably carries out the policy of
the statute for society in general can be imposed on an individual as a
regulatory burden even though he can show that there is neither a harm
to be avoided nor a necessity for applying the statute to him to vindicate
the purpose of the statute. In the administration of a statute an indi-
vidual cannot demand a hearing as of right to determine whether he falls
within the evil the statute was intended to correct. Often a person will
claim he is an "innocent" caught within the working of a statute. He
feels the policy has no application to him. Thus, in Hawker, if the pur-
pose of the statute was to maintain high medical standards of character
and competence, and the legislature decided that conviction of a felony
was an indication of lack of character, a doctor cannot demand a hearing
to show his good character notwithstanding the legislative presumption
of bad character.23' An "innocent" individual must suffer the same bur-
den as the "evil" individuals once the statute has been substantively ap-
proved as proper legislation.232 The only possibility of relief is that there
are enough "innocents" within the scope of the statute to merit a chal-
lenge on equal protection or substantive due process grounds. This re-
striction on an "innocent's" activity can be justified only as the price an
individual must pay for living in an organized society which must neces-
sarily legislate with broad standards.
One concludes that under civil procedure, the government can insti-
tute a suit and burden an individual solely on the ground that such a
burden is necessary to carry out legitimate governmental ends, i.e., to
shape individual behavior. There is no standard by which one can tell
when the statute must provide criminal protection since none of the cases
were decided on constitutional grounds. However, when a challenge
forces the issue, it is doubtful whether the test of carrying out the pur-
pose of the statute will be of much aid in that determination.
231. Cf. Hawker, 170 U.S. at 197.
232. A holding company cannot plead that its own conduct in accumulating a wide-
spread financial empire did not result in the evils the statute was attempting to avoid and
therefore an application to it would be violative of due process. North American Co. v.
SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 710 (1946). Cf. Johnson v. Board of Dental Examiners, 134 F.2d 9,
12 (D.C. Cir. 1943). "There is nothing in the Act to indicate that the Board must con-
sider each licensee separately in respect of the location of his office building, his office
floor, local traffic conditions, etc.... As we see it-if a general dimensional regulation
of this character is reasonable, if it substantially effectuates the purpose of an act de-
signed to promote the public health and safety, it cannot be considered to contravene the
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. Like the rain, which falleth on the just and on the
unjust, the regulations of the Board affect alike all dentists in the District of Columbia.
In legislation of this character, and regulations thereunder, it may well be that conscien-
tious and responsible members of the profession are affected by regulations designed to
constrain their less scrupulous brethren in the exploitation of the public."
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Another classification. 3 is based on the type of harm effected by
the sanction. In this explanation, sanctions are classified as punitive
(implying harms involving moral culpability), corrective ("harms that
do not involve moral culpability, but which are sufficiently dangerous to
warrant application of social measures" and which imply a capacity to
learn on the part of the burdened individual), protective (a similar harm,
but with little prospect of rehabilitation, making the main purpose segre-
gation), and compensatory (the traditional sanctions of contract and tort
law which provide reparation). Although this classification is as per-
ceptive as any put forth, it is lacking in two regards. First, the concept
of corrective sanction should be expanded to include governmental bur-
dens which rehabilitate and train, such as the threat of loss of a license to
practice a profession for incompetency and the unfavorable publicity that
accompanies the finding of an administrative body. Further, the clas-
sification seems more useful in describing the purpose of the legislature
in passing the statute than in indicating the nature of the harm itself, if
one assumes that each type of harm in the classification is intended to be
mutually exclusive. If the characteristic of a punitive sanction is that
the harm contains moral turpitude, an examination of some harms for
which reparation is exacted indicates they also contain immoral conduct
which is the subject of punitive sanctions. As an example, an intentional
breech of-contract involves immoral conduct and results in social and in-
dividual harm. Yet it is considered civilly compensable. Finally, this
classification develops no standards to aid the court in the very practical
situation we have assumed, i.e., a defendant requesting criminal pro-
cedural safeguards.
After making this four-fold classification of sanctions, Dr. Jerome
Hall lists some characteristics that make criminal sanctions distinctive.
While punishment is a deliberate infliction of suffering on the offender
himself because of past moral wrong, reparation implies no suffering, no
moral culpability, and no final personal liability on the individual because
of the possibility of economically shifting the defendant's damages. But
does not a $100,000 tort liability imply suffering to a defendant just as
does six months in jail? Although there is no strain of moral culpability
running through a suit for negligence, certainly in intentional torts and
an intentional breach of contract one finds ethical behavior very much
involved.
4. Nature of the right protected by the statute. Two analyses focus
on the nature of the rights protected in the statute. One approach is that
233. HALL, PRiNcim'.Es OF CRImINAL LAW 317-22 (1947).
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criminal law involves public rights while civil law deals with private
rights.23  But its utility as an analytical aid is questionable. All anti-
social conduct involves both individual and societal harms. As an illus-
tration, just as rape both harms the individual physically and emotionally
and harms society by disrupting the orderly, peaceful, stable functioning
of social institutions, so also does an intentional breach of contract cause
both individual financial harm and social problems, especially in a sys-
tem of private capitalism where economic production and distribution is
carried out in reliance on a set of private agreements. Both facets of
conduct are intentional; both are immoral. One seems unable to label
statutes on this basis. The public-private distinction seems only an ex
post description of causes of action after they are in the hands either of
individuals or the government. "'
The Speiser case indicates the Court will give currency to the concept
of a spectrum of rights, the deprivation of a more important right to be
afforded the protections of criminal procedures. That this approach has
fundamental weaknesses was sufficiently discussed in the section on
test oaths. "'
5. Conclusion. The purpose of this part was merely to differen-
tiate punishment in its separation of powers and substantive contexts and
catalogue and examine various theories of substantive punishment to illus-
trate the complexities, intracacies, and contradictions involved when
courts attempt to set standards or evolve a formula to differentiate be-
tween punishment and regulation. Although the purpose was not to pro-
vide any new test for analyzing punishment, some suggestions might be
in order.
First, one cannot expect too much from a theory." Each of the
234. "The distinction of public wrongs from private, of crimes and misdemeanors
from civil injuries, seems principally to consist in this: that private wrongs, or civil in-
juries, are an infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong to individuals,
considered merely as individuals: public wrongs of crimes and misdemeanors, are a
breach and violation of the public rights and duties, due to the whole community, con-
sidered as a community, in its social aggregate capacity." 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
5 (1807).
235. "The distinction between public crimes and private injuries seems entirely to
be created by positive laws, and is referable only to civil institutions.' Ibid.
236. See text accompanying notes 144-47 supra.
237. Possibly the conclusion is that there are no workable standards at all. Cf.,
"The astute reader may object that these definitions are 'circlar'--in other words, that
we cannot tell whether an act is a crime unless we know whether it can legally be fol-
lowed by criminal proceedings, and we cannot tell whether it can legally be followed by
criminal proceedings unless we know whether it is a crime; so also with civil wrongs.
The difficulty here is more apparent than real. It is true that our definition does not
tell us whether a particular act is a crime or a civil wrong; but no definition can. If a
definition could be framed to do this, there would be no further law of criminal and
civil wrong for the student to learn! All the definition can do is to explain how law-
yers use the terms 'criminal' and 'civil wrong."' WILLIAMS, LEARNING THE LAw 6 (6th
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many attempts to provide a test for punishment has utility and solves the
problem in certain instances, but it seems unavailing to generalize from
them to form a workable formula for future cases. The major weakness
of all the approaches listed is in their explanation of governmental sanc-
tions. Well understood is the typical punishment in the public law field
with criminal procedure. And certain historically-conditioned examples
of private punishment continue to exist. We rationalize certain govern-
mentally-instituted suits within the area of private law as compensatory,
the government suing (in a public tort capacity) as a property owner, or
as a party to a contract. But in a theory one must accommodate for the
many administrative sanctions that are enforced in the area of private
law. To strain to label them compensatory is to distort their purpose
which is to deter persons from violating the law, as is exemplified in the
money penalties in income tax and contract fraud cases. Certainly many
other sanctions have as their purpose forcing adherence to a statutory
definition of approved conduct. Only when sanctions such as these are
accepted for what they are will the way be clear for an attempt to make
a comprehensive statement of the nature of criminal and civil burdens.
PART III. THE PEREZ AND THE TROP CASES
With the foregoing background, one is ready to re-examine these
two recent cases and evaluate their holdings. The Perez case.88 held that
the Government can use expatriation as a regulatory burden to carry out
a valid police power goal. However, Mr. Justice Whittaker,.. one of
the six Justices who agree with this proposition, dissented on the particu-
lar application in this statute.24 Three members (Warren, Douglas, and
Black) dissented on other grounds, stating that one can lose his citizen-
ship only by voluntary abandonment, that the extent of legislative power
is to determine that certain conduct indicates such voluntary renunciation,
and that the Court can review the wisdom of the legislative judgment.
The conduct here that caused automatic denationalization was voting
in a foreign election. Frankfurter (with Brennan, Burton, Harlan, and
Clark) stated that such a burden was a legitimate exercise of congres-
ed. 1957). One can only rebut to the positivist position that judges must wish the prob-
lem was as simple as Williams states it is.
238. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
239. Because there are seven opinions in the two cases, it is necessary to refer
again and again to the authors individually. The commentator intends no disrespect when
in the attempt to avoid a stilted style, he subsequently omits the title of "Justice" in refer-
ence to the various authors.
240. 54 Stat. 1137 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1952) : "A person who is a national
of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: ...
(e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election
or plebescite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory."
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sional power to regulate foreign affairs. He reasoned that since Con-
gress has the implied power to regulate foreign affairs, it has the power
to deal with and prevent incidents that might be "embarrassing" to the
conduct of these foreign relations. It is possible that Congress felt that
voting in a foreign election was embarrassing. Further, expatriation as
a regulatory burden can be justified because it eliminates the source of
embarrassment, i.e., that a person is participating in the formal political
affairs of two countries. This latter approach is consistent with the
"narrow-gauge" test for regulation. Further, the Frankfurter opinion
states the Court need only find that a "rational nexus" exists between the
power over foreign affairs and the working of the statute. In an anti-
cipated rebuttal to Warren, Frankfurter observed that Congress felt that
voting in a foreign election indicated less than full alliance to the United
States and thereby forms a legitimate ground for inferring voluntary re-
nunciation. This opinion typifies the judicial deference to legislative de-
cision that is labeled judicial abnegation.
Whittaker agreed with Frankfurter that the Government possesses
the power to denationalize a citizen, but, in an example of piercing review
of legislative wisdom, stated that in this particular case voting was neither
embarrassing nor indicative of a voluntary abandonment of citizenship.
Warren (with Douglas and Black) proposed the theory that citizen-
ship is a right which is given to native-born citizens by the fourteenth
amendment and can be lost only if a person voluntarily renounces it. It
is the most basic of our liberties; in fact, it is the right to have rights.
Agreeing with Whittaker, Warren said it is unreasonable to infer that
by voting in a foreign election a person intended voluntarily to surrender
his citizenship. Douglas and Black wrote an opinion emphasizing the
Warren view as to possible excesses in the future if expatriation is al-
lowed as a burden. But Perez stands for the fact, as Warren concedes,
that "citizenship may be divested in the exercise of some governmental
power. ' 241
In the Trop case, 42 the basic issue of using expatriation as a burden
is settled. The liberal wing of the Court accepted this holding, but
battled further on the concept that some uses of denationalization actually
are punishment. But if this is so, one must know how to determine
when it is used as punishment, and once that is established, what consti-
tutional doctrines limit the use of the burden.
The provision of the Nationality Act under examination in Trop
stated that a court-martial conviction for desertion in wartime plus a dis-
241. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 93 (1958).
242. Id. at 86.
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honorable discharge with no subsequent restoration to active duty resulted
in denationalization. 43 The statute was held unconstitutional, but with-
out a majority adhering to any single theory. Warren (joined by Black,
Douglas, and Whittaker) said that expatriation in these circumstances is
cruel and unusual punishment. Brennan (who agreed with the majority
in Perez) found that expatriation under these facts was unreasonable
regulation; the legislature could not reasonably use expatriation as a
punishment. Frankfurter (with Burton, Harlan and Clark) never
reached these questions because he held the burden was similar to that in
the Perez case. He justified expatriation as a burden on non-penal
grounds-that the legislature had jurisdiction under the war power to
pass laws to maintain the discipline of our soldiers abroad.
The effect of these two cases, with their interrelated and tangled
theories leaves one in a quandary as to the present state of the law. It
seems that expatriation may be:
1. A result of voluntary conduct. (All Justices agree as to this.)
The legislature may define from what conduct one may infer abandon-
ment of citizenship. Four members of the Court will review this in-
ference closely (Warren, Black, Douglas and Whittaker).
2. Used as a means of carrying out the governmental police powers.
As indicated above, the Government can sanction its statutes by burdens
that are penal or regulatory. The issue becomes deciding which the leg-
islature intended:
a. If it is imposed as a burden incident to regulation.
(1) The Frankfurter wing (five Justices) will conduct only a
timid review of the "rational nexus" between the police
power and the conduct defined, and the burden imposed for
non-compliance with the standards enumerated.
(2) Whittaker will make a more vigorous review. Warren,
Douglas, and Black would probably join in an effort to
limit, as much as possible, the use of loss of citizenship as
a "necessary and proper" burden.
b. But if expatriation is imposed as a punishment.
(1) Warren, Douglas, Black and Whittaker feel that when it is
used as a type of punishment, expatriation is cruel and un-
243. 54 Stat. 4 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (8) (1952):
"A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturaliza-
tion, shall lose his nationality by: . . .
(g) Deserting the military or naval forces of the United States in time of war,
provided he is convicted thereof by court martial and as the result of such conviction
is dismissed or dishonorably discharged from the service of such military forces: Pro-
vided [that] . . . restoration to active duty . . . shall be deemed to have the immediate
effect of restoring such nationality or citizenship and all civil and political rights. .. ."
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usual per se and falls under the eighth amendment.
(2) Brennan would examine the relationship of the punishment
to the crime in terms of the ends of criminal law (deter-
rence and rehabilitation) to decide whether it was rationally
imposed.
(3) The Frankfurter wing will be hesitant to say that this bur-
den is punishment in any circumstances, with the result that
they will not reach this question at all.
Therefore there is great necessity to examine the standards used to
determine whether expatriation is used as a punishment or as a valid reg-
ulatory burden. This Part will not evaluate the military power versus
civil authority issue that is in the background of the Trop case, an issue
which troubled Black and Douglas. It will not re-examine the arguments
for and against using expatriation as a regulatory burden, but will ac-
cept the Perez holding as part of present doctrine.244 The wisdom of
Warren's choice of the eighth amendment as the basis of his hold-
ing in the Trop case is bound to be controversial (and may precipitate a
flurry of eighth amendment cases as Lovett did in the attainder field).
This note will not add any comment to the wisdom of its use but will
suggest an alternative disposition for the case. Nor will it become em-
broiled in the debate over the wisdom of abnegation, for that would
merely duplicate arguments more persuasively presented elsewhere. It
will confine itself to a critical evaluation of the criteria the Court used to
determine that the Trop burden was a penal burden.
1. The form of the statute. Frankfurter24 argued that the law
was technically not punishment and that he could find a non-penal end
to be served by the burden of expatriation, i.e., maintaining the morale of
our troops during wartime. This opinion is reminiscent of Frankfurter
in Lovett where he refused to find punishment when the question was
one of attainder. In rebuttal Warren seems on solid ground when he
states that "form cannot provide the answer." '246 If Garland and Cum-
inins are still the law, they contradict the dissenters. Lovett certainly is
recent authority to the contrary. Therefore form is not the final arbiter.
2. Severity. All three relevant opinions in Trop state that the se-
244. As for the unavailability of expatriation as a sanction, cf. the discussion of the
"severe remedy of outlawry" which was never known to the federal law and is unavail-
able to federal courts. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
245. 356 U.S. at 122, 125.
246. Id. at 95. "But the government contends that this statute does not impose a
penalty. . . . We are told this is so because a committee of Cabinet members, in
recommending this legislation to the Congress, said it 'technically is not a penal law.'
How simple would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication and of law generally if
specific problems could be solved by inspection of the labels pasted on them !" Id. at 94.
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verity of the punishment is not controlling. But Warren,"' in determin-
ing the legislative purpose, said it is "relevant" to a determination that
the legislature is punishing. Brennan 4. felt that it is not enough itself to
invalidate the statutes, but that severity forces the Court to "look closely"
to see if it is justified in reason. Frankfurter249 felt that even though there
are "severe" and "even tragic" consequences, this is no indication that
the burden is punishment. His argument that denationalization is like
deportation and denaturalization which are not punishment is rebutted
by Warren's insistence that the latter two restrictions on aliens are not
applicable to citizens.
All these Justices seem correct that severity is not itself controlling.
Cummins and Garland stated that any burden, however slight, can be
punishment, if so intended by the legislature. Warren stated the best
proposition, that severity may be relevant in as much as it indicates an
intent to punish.
3. Consequence of a violation or a conviction. Both Warren and
Brennan further found indications of "punishment" since the burden
follows a crime. Warren,2 ' while cryptically discussing why the bur-
den here is not regulation under the war power, stated that Congress can
make rules under this power, but a statute that provides consequences for
its violation is penal. One queries this. Examples such as license revo-
cation and disqualification for voting or for public office are conse-
quences, but they are not penal. Hawker itself is a refutation of this idea.
There, the statute provided a "consequence of a violation" which was not
penal. Brennan25' also indicated adherence to the "consequence" view. He
found punishment indicated by the fact that the statute expressly pro-
vides that citizenship will be lost "if and when he is convicted by a court
martial." Again Hawker disposes of this thesis. In that case a person,
on conviction, automatically loses the opportunity of ever becoming a
doctor, but the burden nevertheless is regulatory.
The inapplicability of the consequence view cuts two ways. First,
a burden may be punishment even though it does not follow a convic-
tion.252 Therefore, cases which conclude that there is no punishment be-
cause there was no formal conviction are erroneous. Second, even though
there has been a conviction, that does not necessarily mean that subse-
247. Id. at 96, n.18.
248. Id. at 111.
249. Id. at 124.
250. Id. at 97.
251. Id. at 109.
252. Cummins.
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quent burdens based on that conduct are penal. " '
4. The purpose of the statute is to punish. Brennan' based his
argument on two grounds. First, the legislative history indicated an
intent of Congress to use the burden as punishment. Also, he argued it
must be punishment, since it is not regulation. He distinguished Perez
where the regulatory burden avoided the evil and concluded that the
burden must be punishment for only in that way does it help wage war.
Warren's analysis.. is more complex. First, he found no help in
the congressional history of the act, dismissing it as "equivocal." But
he did state that when a court must determine if a statute is penal in an
attainder or ex post facto challenge, it must find the purpose of the stat-
ute. Citing Lovett, Garland and Cummins, he stated that if the purpose
is to reprimand the wrong-doer or deter others, it is penal; but it is non-
penal if the statute is deemed to accomplish some other legitimate govern-
mental purpose.
In determining what is the purpose, Warren argued25 that expatria-
tion must be penal since there is no other legitimate end it could serve.
He made the irrelevant statement that it cannot fall within the scope of
the power over foreign relation as did Perez. But this provision was an
exercise of the war power and its "narrow-gauge" regulatory effects
should have been analyzed in relation to the purpose of maintaining mili-
tary discipline. As discussed above Warren felt expatriation could not
be justified as a regulation under the war power; for although under that
power Congress can set standards, the consequence of violating these
regulatory provisions is a penal law. Therefore, he concluded since this
burden is punishment, it provides a basis for further examination under
the eighth amendment to see if it is cruel and unusual.
Warren's analysis is less than satisfying in setting standards for
future decisions. His opinion seems to be an ad hoc reaction that the
purpose of this statute is punishment. Although he cites Lovett, Garland
and Cummins as examples where the Court must find the intent of the
legislature, he fails to use the tests developed in those cases. In fact the
Test Oath cases and the relevancy test used there to determine the legisla-
tive purpose involved retrospective statutes with a 'fixed group burdened.
The statute in the Trop case was a qualification, and there is no hint of
an attainder. After this decision one is in a quandary as to how to de-
termine the purpose of a similar statute. Warren states only his conclu-
253. Hawker.
254. 356 U.S. at 107-10.
255. Id. at 95, 96.
256. Id. at 97.
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sion that the statute involved punishes. He does not indicate whether one
should use the relevancy test of Cummins and Garland or some other
criteria to find the "evident purpose" of Congress in passing a law. The
former approach involves some theoretical difficulty, for the relevancy
test used in these circumstances does not necessarily involve punishment.
The statutes in Trop were prospective and involved a shifting class. In
a prospective statute, if the relevancy test shows there was no relation
between the conduct resulting in dishonorable discharge and fitness to
be a soldier, he has merely shown that the regulation is unreasonable, not
that Congress intended the burden to be punishment. The relevancy test
in Cummins and Garland indicated a congressional intent to punish be-
cause there was a fixed group involved. Certainly one cannot argue on
the basis of those cases that an unreasonable prospective statute is
punshment.
In review, Warren's arguments that expatriation as used here is a
punishment are not convincing. The congressional history of the act is
"equivocal." That expatriation is severe is indeed some indication of a
penal intent, but it is not controlling. The criteria of "consequences" is
hazy and not helpful. Finally the bald statement that "there is no other
purpose" of expatriation but to punish gives one no aid in determining
why this statute is penal or in setting standards for future decisions.
If this is the case, would not the Court have been on more firm
ground to agree with Frankfurter that the burden was non-penal regula-
tion, but to examine the statute on grounds of substantive due process?
It is assumed that only its concept of abnegation prevents the Court from
reevaluating the advisability of a particular regulatory burden. But if
the Court was willing to demonstrate so much vigorous review in de-
termining that the burden here was punishment when the statute was
written in terms of regulation, could not the same energies be applied to
a review of a non-penal burden?
It seems to the commentator that this sort of judicial review could
have avoided any discussion of penal burdens and merely reviewed a
regulatory burden. Form, as explained above, is never the final test of
the nature of a statute. But when one need not second-guess the form
(as here, where the Court could review the burden as regulation), it
seems better to reveiw on this ground. Note that where the Court has
"cut through form," as in the Test Oatk cases, it was necessary to do so,
because a regulatory statute was challenged as attainder or ex post facto.
Here, it is not necessary. To review the burden as regulation would
have avoided the introduction of several questionable doctrines and un-
certain tests into the already complex field of regulation and punishment.
NOTES
Had Warren agreed with Frankfurter that expatriation here is a
burden incident to regulation, but that it is an excessive burden and un-
reasonable under the fifth amendment, there would have been no need
for the transfer of separation of power concepts into this new area.
Whichever theory the Court would use to invalidate the statute, by analy-
sis either in terms of "punishment" or "regulation," involves a great deal
of judicial second-guessing, but this latter method seems to provide a
much less intricate analysis. If cast as a regulatory burden, the statute
would be interpreted: Under the war power Congress has jurisdiction
to deal with conduct that affects military discipline. Congress in this
statute said dishonorable discharge on conviction of desertion was rele-
vant to maintaining discipline and prescribed the regulatory burden of
expatriation for such conduct and conviction. This formula could be
attacked on two grounds. First, following Whittaker's approach in
Perez, one could challenge the assumption that all dishonorable discharges
actually affected troops' discipline. Further, one could say that the regu-
latory burden was "excessive" and "unreasonable." This would involve
many of the same considerations that Warren and Brennan brought out
in their opinion in regard to punishment-the severity of the burden and
the fact that expatriation does not avoid the harm intended.
The decisions where the Court has reviewed either the conduct pro-
scribed or the burden imposed seem to be split. But two cases indicate
that the Court will review the former, and a third, the latter. These cases
involve qualifications for professions, and have a background of anti-
communist legislation, but their holdings are applicable to this case. In
Weiman v. Updegraff,2" ' the holding in effect was that innocent member-
ship in the Communist Party was not relevant to standards of teaching,
i.e., it did not indicate that one should not teach. Schlockauer v. Bd. of
Higher Education,"' which invalidated a New York statute providing for
automatic dismissal of any city employee who took the fifth amendment,
indicated that exercising one's rights under that amendment was not rele-
vant to the qualifications of teachers. Trop could follow this lead. Dis-
honorable discharge for desertion, since it can be based on so many
grounds (many of which are "innocent" desertions), does not reasonably
affect discipline to the degree to justify expatriation as an exercise of
the war power.
As for the burden itself being unreasonable or excessive, one can
look to Sacher v. United States."9 The Supreme Court stated that dis-
257. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
258. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
259. 354 U.S. 930 (1956).
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barment was too "excessive" a judgment in a suit instituted on the basis
of- Sacher's contempt conviction as counsel in the Dennis case.
These cases, although not completely symmetrical, -would have pro-
vided the Court with precedent had the majority rechanneled its energies
to find a regulatory burden unreasonable or excessive, instead of a pun-
ishment- cruel and unjust. This would have been a happy alternative to
the Court's disposition, for the present holding will only confuse and
further tangle the distinction between ptinishment and regulation.
CONTROLLING FARM TENANT CONSERVATION PRACTICES
THROUGH THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
The problems for soil conservation that are created by the divided
ownership of farm lands are both perennial and still largely unsolved.
When farm land is leased, the tenant's desire to secure maximum produc-
tivity from the soil conflicts with both the lessor's interest in preserving
the value of his property and society's interest in conserving arable farm
land.' Social concern over the proper use of leased farm land was first
manifested in the ancient common law action of waste. However, the
standards applied to farm tenant practices were uncertain,2 while the
remedies of injunctive relief and damages were either unavailable or
1. As of 1953, after close to twenty years of an intensive federal soil conservation
program, this country suffered an estimated loss of 500,000 acres a year of soil originally
suitable for cultivation. Erosion and other deteriorative factors were responsible. U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, LAND FAcTs 2 (1953). Furthermore, there is evidence that the
incidence of soil depleting practices has a direct relationship to the incidence of farm
tenancy. Cotton, Regulations of Farm Landlord-Tenant Relations, 4 LAw & CoNTEM,.
PROD. 509, 520 (1937).
The percentage of farm land under lease in the United States has declined since
1935 when it stood at 44.7%. However, in 1954 over one-third of the farm land in this
country was still operated under some type of lease (35.1%). BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A GRAPHiC SUMMARY OF FARM TENURE 134 (1954).
2. E.g., not waste to permit land to lie uncultivated and grow up in weeds. Lee v.
Weerda, 124 Wash. 168, 213 Pac. 919 (1923). Must show willful acts. U.S. v. Bost-
wick, 94 U.S. 53 (1876) ; Wright v. Connor, 200 Ga. 413, 37 S.E. 353 (1946). Must show
injury to inheritance. Kory v. Less, 180 Ark. 342, 22 S.W.2d 25 (1929) ; Pynchon v.
Stearns, 11 Met. 304 (Mass. 1846) ;. Sparkman v. Hardy, 78 So. 2d 584 (Miss. 1955) ;
Proffitt v. Henderson, 29 Mo. 325 (1860); Fleming v. Sexton, 172 N.C. 250, 90 S.E.
247 (1916) ; McCullough v. Irvine, 13 Pa. 438 (1850) ; Keeler v. Eastman, 11 Vt. 293
(1839) ; Lee v. Weerda, mpra.
3. Damages. Modern waste statutes provide treble or double damages, or for-
feiture where a case of waste is made out against the tenant. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 199 (Supp. 1948) (citations to state waste statutes). The forfeiture provisions are
frequently not applied if the waste complained of is permissive rather than voluntary.
Richards v. Torbert, 8 Del. (3 Houst.) 172 (1865) ; Collins v. Security Trust Co., 206
Ky. 30, 266 S.W. 910 (1924). The difficulty of assessing damages when the soil has
been depleted or permitted to erode is inherent in the nature of the injury.
